Internet-Draft | WAMP-AP | July 2024 |
Oberstein | Expires 24 January 2025 | [Page] |
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 January 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
While all implementations MUST implement the subset of the Basic Profile necessary for the particular set of WAMP roles they provide, they MAY implement any subset of features from the Advanced Profile. Implementers SHOULD implement the maximum of features possible considering the aims of an implementation.¶
Note: Features listed here may be experimental or underspecced and yet unimplemented in any implementation. This part of the specification is very much a work in progress. An approximate status of each feature is given at the beginning of the feature section.¶
Support for advanced features must be announced by the peers which implement them. The following is a complete list of advanced features currently defined or proposed.¶
Advanced RPC Features¶
Feature | Status | Caller | Dealer | Callee |
---|---|---|---|---|
Progressive Call Results | stable | X | X | X |
Progressive Call Invocations | alpha | X | X | X |
Call Timeout | alpha | X | X | X |
Call Canceling | alpha | X | X | X |
Caller Identification | stable | X | X | X |
Call Trustlevels | alpha | X | X | |
Registration Meta API | beta | X | ||
Pattern-based Registration | stable | X | X | |
Shared Registration | beta | X | X | |
Sharded Registration | alpha | X | X | |
Registration Revocation | alpha | X | X | |
(Interface) Procedure Reflection | sketch | X |
Advanced PubSub Features¶
Feature | Status | Publisher | Broker | Subscriber |
---|---|---|---|---|
Subscriber Blackwhite Listing | stable | X | X | |
Publisher Exclusion | stable | X | X | |
Publisher Identification | stable | X | X | X |
Publication Trustlevels | alpha | X | X | |
Subscription Meta API | beta | X | ||
Pattern-based Subscription | stable | X | X | |
Sharded Subscription | alpha | X | X | |
Event History | beta | X | ||
(Interface) Topic Reflection | sketch | X |
Other Advanced Features¶
Feature | Status |
---|---|
Challenge-response Authentication | stable |
Ticket authentication | beta |
Cryptosign authentication | beta |
RawSocket transport | stable |
Batched WebSocket transport | sketch |
HTTP Longpoll transport | beta |
Session Meta API | beta |
Call Rerouting | sketch |
Payload Passthru Mode | sketch |
The status of the respective AP feature is marked as follows:¶
Status | Description |
---|---|
sketch | There is a rough description of an itch to scratch, but the feature use case isn't clear, and there is no protocol proposal at all. |
alpha | The feature use case is still fuzzy and/or the feature definition is unclear, but there is at least a protocol level proposal. |
beta | The feature use case is clearly defined and the feature definition in the spec is sufficient to write a prototype implementation. The feature definition and details may still be incomplete and change. |
stable | The feature definition in the spec is complete and stable and the feature use case is field proven in real applications. There are multiple, interoperable implementations. |
The Advanced Profile defines additional WAMP-level messages which are explained in detail in separate sections. The following 4 additional message types MAY be used in the Advanced Profile and their direction between peer roles. Here, "Tx" ("Rx") means the message is sent (received) by a peer of the respective role.¶
Code | Message | Publisher | Broker | Subscriber | Caller | Dealer | Callee |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4 |
CHALLENGE
|
Rx | Tx | Rx | Rx | Tx | Rx |
5 |
AUTHENTICATE
|
Tx | Rx | Tx | Tx | Rx | Tx |
49 |
CANCEL
|
Tx | Rx | ||||
69 |
INTERRUPT
|
Tx | Rx |
The CHALLENGE
message is used with certain Authentication Methods. During authenticated session establishment, a Router sends a challenge message.¶
[CHALLENGE, AuthMethod|string, Extra|dict]¶
The AUTHENTICATE
message is used with certain Authentication Methods. A Client having received a challenge is expected to respond by sending a signature or token.¶
[AUTHENTICATE, Signature|string, Extra|dict]¶
WAMP enables the monitoring of when sessions join a realm on the router or when they leave it via Session Meta Events. It also allows retrieving information about currently connected sessions via Session Meta Procedures.¶
Meta events are created by the router itself. This means that the events, as well as the data received when calling a meta procedure, can be accorded the same trust level as the router.¶
Note that an implementation that only supports a Broker or Dealer role, not both at the same time, essentially cannot offer the Session Meta API, as it requires both roles to support this feature.¶
The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs
¶
which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by both Dealers and Brokers via:¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. session_meta_api|bool := true¶
Here is a WELCOME
message from a Router with support for both the Broker and Dealer role, and with support for Session Meta API:¶
[ 2, 4580268554656113, { "authid":"OL3AeppwDLXiAAPbqm9IVhnw", "authrole": "anonymous", "authmethod": "anonymous", "roles": { "broker": { "features": { "session_meta_api": true } }, "dealer": { "features": { "session_meta_api": true } } } } ]¶
Note in particular that the feature is announced on both the Broker and the Dealer roles.¶
A client can subscribe to the following session meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a session:¶
wamp.session.on_join
: Fired when a session joins a realm on the router.¶
wamp.session.on_leave
: Fired when a session leaves a realm on the router or is disconnected.¶
Session Meta Events MUST be dispatched by the Router to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.¶
Fired when a session joins a realm on the router. The event payload consists of a single positional argument details|dict
:¶
session|id
- The session ID of the session that joined¶
authid|string
- The authentication ID of the session that joined¶
authrole|string
- The authentication role of the session that joined¶
authmethod|string
- The authentication method that was used for authentication the session that joined¶
authprovider|string
- The provider that performed the authentication of the session that joined¶
transport|dict
- Optional, implementation defined information about the WAMP transport the joined session is running over.¶
See Authentication for a description of the
authid
,authrole
,authmethod
andauthprovider
properties.¶
Fired when a session leaves a realm on the router or is disconnected. The event payload consists of three positional arguments:¶
A client can actively retrieve information about sessions, or forcefully close sessions, via the following meta-procedures:¶
wamp.session.count
: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the realm.¶
wamp.session.list
: Retrieves a list of the session IDs for all sessions currently attached to the realm.¶
wamp.session.get
: Retrieves information on a specific session.¶
wamp.session.kill
: Kill a single session identified by session ID.¶
wamp.session.kill_by_authid
: Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authid.¶
wamp.session.kill_by_authrole
: Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authrole.¶
wamp.session.kill_all
: Kill all currently connected sessions in the caller's realm.¶
Session meta procedures MUST be registered by the Router on the same realm as the WAMP session about which information is retrieved.¶
Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the realm.¶
Positional arguments¶
filter_authroles|list[string]
- Optional filter: if provided, only count sessions with an authrole
from this list.¶
Positional results¶
count|int
- The number of sessions currently attached to the realm.¶
Retrieves a list of the session IDs for all sessions currently attached to the realm.¶
Positional arguments¶
filter_authroles|list[string]
- Optional filter: if provided, only count sessions with an authrole
from this list.¶
Positional results¶
session_ids|list
- List of WAMP session IDs (order undefined).¶
Retrieves information on a specific session.¶
Positional arguments¶
session|id
- The session ID of the session to retrieve details for.¶
Positional results¶
details|dict
- Information on a particular session:¶
session|id
- The session ID of the session that joined¶
authid|string
- The authentication ID of the session that joined¶
authrole|string
- The authentication role of the session that joined¶
authmethod|string
- The authentication method that was used for authentication the session that joined¶
authprovider|string
- The provider that performed the authentication of the session that joined¶
transport|dict
- Optional, implementation defined information about the WAMP transport the joined session is running over.¶
See Authentication for a description of the
authid
,authrole
,authmethod
andauthprovider
properties.¶
Errors¶
wamp.error.no_such_session
- No session with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Kill a single session identified by session ID.¶
The caller of this meta procedure may only specify session IDs other than its own session. Specifying the caller's own session will result in a wamp.error.no_such_session
since no other session with that ID exists.¶
The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed
and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE
sent to the closed session.¶
Positional arguments¶
session|id
- The session ID of the session to close.¶
Keyword arguments¶
reason|uri
- reason for closing session, sent to client in GOODBYE.Reason
.¶
message|string
- additional information sent to client in GOODBYE.Details
under the key "message".¶
Errors¶
Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authid
.¶
If the caller's own session has the specified authid
, the caller's session is excluded from the closed sessions.¶
The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed
and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE
sent to the closed session.¶
Positional arguments¶
authid|string
- The authentication ID identifying sessions to close.¶
Keyword arguments¶
reason|uri
- reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
¶
message|string
- additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details
under the key "message".¶
Positional results¶
sessions|list
- The list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed.¶
Errors¶
wamp.error.invalid_uri
- A reason
keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.¶
Kill all currently connected sessions that have the specified authrole
.¶
If the caller's own session has the specified authrole
, the caller's session is excluded from the closed sessions.¶
The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed
and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE
sent to the closed session.¶
Positional arguments¶
authrole|string
- The authentication role identifying sessions to close.¶
Keyword arguments¶
reason|uri
- reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
¶
message|string
- additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details
under the key "message".¶
Positional results¶
count|int
- The number of sessions closed by this meta procedure.¶
Errors¶
wamp.error.invalid_uri
- A reason
keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.¶
Kill all currently connected sessions in the caller's realm.¶
The caller's own session is excluded from the closed sessions. Closing all sessions in the realm will not generate session meta events or testament events, since no subscribers would remain to receive these events.¶
The keyword arguments are optional, and if not provided the reason defaults to wamp.close.killed
and the message is omitted from the GOODBYE
sent to the closed session.¶
Keyword arguments¶
reason|uri
- reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
¶
message|string
- additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details
under the key "message".¶
Positional results¶
count|int
- The number of sessions closed by this meta procedure.¶
Errors¶
wamp.error.invalid_uri
- A reason
keyword argument has a value that is not a valid non-empty URI.¶
Registration Meta Events are fired when registrations are first created, when Callees are attached (removed) to (from) a registration, and when registrations are finally destroyed.¶
Furthermore, WAMP allows actively retrieving information about registrations via Registration Meta Procedures.¶
Meta-events are created by the router itself. This means that the events as well as the data received when calling a meta-procedure can be accorded the same trust level as the router.¶
Note that an implementation that only supports a Broker or Dealer role, not both at the same time, essentially cannot offer the Registration Meta API, as it requires both roles to support this feature.¶
The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in:¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs
¶
which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by a Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via:¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. registration_meta_api|bool := true¶
Here is a WELCOME
message from a Router with support for both the Broker and Dealer role, and with support for Registration Meta API:¶
[ 2, 4580268554656113, { "authid":"OL3AeppwDLXiAAPbqm9IVhnw", "authrole": "anonymous", "authmethod": "anonymous", "roles": { "broker": { "features": { } }, "dealer": { "features": { "registration_meta_api": true } } } } ]¶
A client can subscribe to the following registration meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a registration:¶
wamp.registration.on_create
: Fired when a registration is created through a registration request for a URI which was previously without a registration.¶
wamp.registration.on_register
: Fired when a Callee session is added to a registration.¶
wamp.registration.on_unregister
: Fired when a Callee session is removed from a registration.¶
wamp.registration.on_delete
: Fired when a registration is deleted after the last Callee session attached to it has been removed.¶
A wamp.registration.on_register
event MUST be fired subsequent to a wamp.registration.on_create
event, since the first registration results in both the creation of the registration and the addition of a session.¶
Similarly, the wamp.registration.on_delete
event MUST be preceded by a wamp.registration.on_unregister
event.¶
Registration Meta Events MUST be dispatched by the router to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.¶
Fired when a registration is created through a registration request for a URI which was previously without a registration. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
session|id
: The session ID performing the registration request.¶
RegistrationDetails|dict
: Information on the created registration.¶
Object Schemas¶
RegistrationDetails := { "id": registration|id, "created": time_created|iso_8601_string, "uri": procedure|uri, "match": match_policy|string, "invoke": invocation_policy|string }¶
See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match_policy
.¶
NOTE: invocation_policy IS NOT YET DESCRIBED IN THE ADVANCED SPEC¶
Fired when a session is added to a registration. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
Fired when a session is removed from a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
Fired when a registration is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
A client can actively retrieve information about registrations via the following meta-procedures:¶
wamp.registration.list
: Retrieves registration IDs listed according to match policies.¶
wamp.registration.lookup
: Obtains the registration (if any) managing a procedure, according to some match policy.¶
wamp.registration.match
: Obtains the registration best matching a given procedure URI.¶
wamp.registration.get
: Retrieves information on a particular registration.¶
wamp.registration.list_callees
: Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the registration.¶
wamp.registration.count_callees
: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the registration.¶
Retrieves registration IDs listed according to match policies.¶
Arguments¶
Results¶
RegistrationLists|dict
: A dictionary with a list of registration IDs for each match policy.¶
Object Schemas¶
RegistrationLists := { "exact": registration_ids|list, "prefix": registration_ids|list, "wildcard": registration_ids|list }¶
See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match policies.¶
Obtains the registration (if any) managing a procedure, according to some match policy.¶
Arguments¶
procedure|uri
: The procedure to lookup the registration for.¶
options|dict
: Same options as when registering a procedure.¶
Results¶
registration|id
: The ID of the registration managing the procedure, if found, or null.¶
Obtains the registration best matching a given procedure URI.¶
Arguments¶
procedure|uri
: The procedure URI to match¶
Results¶
registration|id
: The ID of best matching registration, or null.¶
Retrieves information on a particular registration.¶
Arguments¶
registration|id
: The ID of the registration to retrieve.¶
Results¶
RegistrationDetails|dict
: Details on the registration.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_registration
: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Object Schemas¶
RegistrationDetails := { "id": registration|id, "created": time_created|iso_8601_string, "uri": procedure|uri, "match": match_policy|string, "invoke": invocation_policy|string }¶
See Pattern-based Registrations for a description of match policies.¶
NOTE: invocation_policy IS NOT YET DESCRIBED IN THE ADVANCED SPEC¶
Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the registration.¶
Arguments¶
registration|id
: The ID of the registration to get callees for.¶
Results¶
callee_ids|list
: A list of WAMP session IDs of callees currently attached to the registration.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_registration
: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to a registration.¶
Arguments¶
registration|id
: The ID of the registration to get the number of callees for.¶
Results¶
count|int
: The number of callees currently attached to a registration.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_registration
: No registration with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Within an application, it may be desirable for a publisher to know whether a publication to a specific topic currently makes sense, i.e. whether there are any subscribers who would receive an event based on the publication. It may also be desirable to keep a current count of subscribers to a topic to then be able to filter out any subscribers who are not supposed to receive an event.¶
Subscription meta-events are fired when topics are first created, when clients subscribe/unsubscribe to them, and when topics are deleted. WAMP allows retrieving information about subscriptions via subscription meta-procedures.¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Brokers via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.broker.features.subscription_meta_api| bool := true¶
Meta-events are created by the router itself. This means that the events as well as the data received when calling a meta-procedure can be accorded the same trust level as the router.¶
The following sections contain an informal, easy to digest description of the WAMP procedures and topics available in (this part of) the WAMP Meta API. A formal definition of the WAMP Meta API in terms of available WAMP procedures and topics including precise and complete type definitions of the application payloads, that is procedure arguments and results or event payloads is contained in¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/schema/wamp-meta.bfbs
¶
<WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp-meta.fbs
¶
which uses FlatBuffers IDL to describe the API. The method of using FlatBuffers IDL and type definitions to formally define WAMP procedures and topics is detailed in section WAMP IDL.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by a Brokers (role := "nroker"
) via:¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. subscription_meta_api|bool := true¶
Here is a WELCOME
message from a Router with support for both the Broker and Dealer role, and with support for Subscription Meta API:¶
[ 2, 4580268554656113, { "authid":"OL3AeppwDLXiAAPbqm9IVhnw", "authrole": "anonymous", "authmethod": "anonymous", "roles": { "broker": { "features": { "subscription_meta_api": true } }, "dealer": { "features": { } } } } ]¶
A client can subscribe to the following session meta-events, which cover the lifecycle of a subscription:¶
wamp.subscription.on_create
: Fired when a subscription is created through a subscription request for a topic which was previously without subscribers.¶
wamp.subscription.on_subscribe
: Fired when a session is added to a subscription.¶
wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe
: Fired when a session is removed from a subscription.¶
wamp.subscription.on_delete
: Fired when a subscription is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed.¶
A wamp.subscription.on_subscribe
event MUST always be fired subsequent to a wamp.subscription.on_create
event, since the first subscribe results in both the creation of the subscription and the addition of a session. Similarly, the wamp.subscription.on_delete
event MUST always be preceded by a wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe
event.¶
The WAMP subscription meta events shall be dispatched by the router to the same realm as the WAMP session which triggered the event.¶
Fired when a subscription is created through a subscription request for a topic which was previously without subscribers. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
session|id
: ID of the session performing the subscription request.¶
SubscriptionDetails|dict
: Information on the created subscription.¶
Object Schemas¶
SubscriptionDetails := { "id": subscription|id, "created": time_created|iso_8601_string, "uri": topic|uri, "match": match_policy|string }¶
See Pattern-based Subscriptions for a description of match_policy
.¶
Fired when a session is added to a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
Fired when a session is removed from a subscription. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
Fired when a subscription is deleted after the last session attached to it has been removed. The event payload consists of positional arguments:¶
A client can actively retrieve information about subscriptions via the following meta-procedures:¶
wamp.subscription.list
: Retrieves subscription IDs listed according to match policies.¶
wamp.subscription.lookup
: Obtains the subscription (if any) managing a topic, according to some match policy.¶
wamp.subscription.match
: Retrieves a list of IDs of subscriptions matching a topic URI, irrespective of match policy.¶
wamp.subscription.get
: Retrieves information on a particular subscription.¶
wamp.subscription.list_subscribers
: Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the subscription.¶
wamp.subscription.count_subscribers
: Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to the subscription.¶
Retrieves subscription IDs listed according to match policies.¶
Arguments - None¶
Results¶
The result consists of one positional argument:¶
SubscriptionLists|dict
: A dictionary with a list of subscription IDs for each match policy.¶
Object Schemas¶
SubscriptionLists := { "exact": subscription_ids|list, "prefix": subscription_ids|list, "wildcard": subscription_ids|list }¶
See Pattern-based Subscriptions for information on match policies.¶
Obtains the subscription (if any) managing a topic, according to some match policy.¶
Arguments¶
topic|uri
: The URI of the topic.¶
options|dict
: Same options as when subscribing to a topic.¶
Results¶
The result consists of one positional argument:¶
subscription|id
: The ID of the subscription managing the topic, if found, or null.¶
Retrieves a list of IDs of subscriptions matching a topic URI, irrespective of match policy.¶
Arguments¶
topic|uri
: The topic to match.¶
Results¶
The result consists of positional arguments:¶
subscription_ids|list
: A list of all matching subscription IDs, or null.¶
Retrieves information on a particular subscription.¶
Arguments¶
subscription|id
: The ID of the subscription to retrieve.¶
Results¶
The result consists of one positional argument:¶
SubscriptionDetails|dict
: Details on the subscription.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_subscription
: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Object Schemas¶
SubscriptionDetails := { "id": subscription|id, "created": time_created|iso_8601_string, "uri": topic|uri, "match": match_policy|string }¶
See Pattern-based Subscriptions for information on match policies.¶
Retrieves a list of session IDs for sessions currently attached to the subscription.¶
Arguments
- subscription|id
: The ID of the subscription to get subscribers for.¶
Results¶
The result consists of positional arguments:¶
subscribers_ids|list
: A list of WAMP session IDs of subscribers currently attached to the subscription.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_subscription
: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.¶
Obtains the number of sessions currently attached to a subscription.¶
Arguments¶
subscription|id
: The ID of the subscription to get the number of subscribers for.¶
Results¶
The result consists of one positional argument:¶
count|int
: The number of sessions currently attached to a subscription.¶
Error URIs¶
wamp.error.no_such_subscription
: No subscription with the given ID exists on the router.¶
A procedure implemented by a Callee and registered at a Dealer may produce progressive results. Progressive results can e.g. be used to return partial results for long-running operations, or to chunk the transmission of larger results sets.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. progressive_call_results|bool := true¶
Additionally, Callees and Dealers MUST support Call Canceling, which is required for canceling progressive results if the original Caller leaves the realm. If a Callee supports Progressive Call Results, but not Call Canceling, then the Dealer disregards the Callees Progressive Call Results feature.¶
Message Flow¶
The message flow for progressive results involves:¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | -----------------> | | | | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | | YIELD (progress)| | | <---------------- | | | | RESULT (progress)| | | <----------------- | | | | | | YIELD (progress)| | | <---------------- | | | | RESULT (progress)| | | <----------------- | | | | | | | | ... | ... | | | | | | YIELD or ERROR | | | <---------------- | | | | RESULT or ERROR | | | <----------------- | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
A Caller indicates its willingness to receive progressive results by setting¶
CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool := true¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL
¶
[ 48, 77133, { "receive_progress": true }, "com.myapp.compute_revenue", [2010, 2011, 2012] ]¶
If the Callee supports Progressive Call Results, the Dealer will forward the Caller's willingness to receive progressive results by setting¶
INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress|bool := true¶
Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION
¶
[ 68, 87683, 324, { "receive_progress": true }, [2010, 2011, 2012] ]¶
An endpoint implementing the procedure produces progressive results by sending YIELD
messages to the Dealer with¶
YIELD.Options.progress|bool := true¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer progressive YIELDs
¶
[ 70, 87683, { "progress": true }, ["Y2010", 120] ]¶
[ 70, 87683, { "progress": true }, ["Y2011", 205] ]¶
Upon receiving an YIELD
message from a Callee with YIELD.Options.progress == true
(for a call that is still ongoing), the Dealer will immediately send a RESULT
message to the original Caller with¶
RESULT.Details.progress|bool := true¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller progressive RESULTs
¶
[ 50, 77133, { "progress": true }, ["Y2010", 120] ]¶
[ 50, 77133, { "progress": true }, ["Y2011", 205] ]¶
and so on...¶
An invocation MUST always end in either a normal RESULT
or ERROR
message being sent by the Callee and received by the Dealer.¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer final YIELD
¶
[ 70, 87683, {}, ["Total", 490] ]¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer final ERROR
¶
[ 8, 68, 87683, {}, "com.myapp.invalid_revenue_year", [1830] ]¶
A call MUST always end in either a normal RESULT
or ERROR
message being sent by the Dealer and received by the Caller.¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller final RESULT
¶
[ 50, 77133, {}, ["Total", 490] ]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller final ERROR
¶
[ 8, 68, 77133, {}, "com.myapp.invalid_revenue_year", [1830] ]¶
In other words: YIELD
with YIELD.Options.progress == true
and RESULT
with RESULT.Details.progress == true
messages may only be sent during a call or invocation is still ongoing.¶
The final YIELD
and final RESULT
may also be empty, e.g. when all actual results have already been transmitted in progressive result messages.¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs
¶
[70, 87683, {"progress": true}, ["Y2010", 120]] [70, 87683, {"progress": true}, ["Y2011", 205]] ... [70, 87683, {"progress": true}, ["Total", 490]] [70, 87683, {}]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs
¶
[50, 77133, {"progress": true}, ["Y2010", 120]] [50, 77133, {"progress": true}, ["Y2011", 205]] ... [50, 77133, {"progress": true}, ["Total", 490]] [50, 77133, {}]¶
The progressive YIELD
and progressive RESULT
may also be empty, e.g. when those messages are only used to signal that the procedure is still running and working, and the actual result is completely delivered in the final YIELD
and RESULT
:¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs
¶
[70, 87683, {"progress": true}] [70, 87683, {"progress": true}] ... [70, 87683, {}, [["Y2010", 120], ["Y2011", 205], ..., ["Total", 490]]]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs
¶
[50, 77133, {"progress": true}] [50, 77133, {"progress": true}] ... [50, 77133, {}, [["Y2010", 120], ["Y2011", 205], ..., ["Total", 490]]]¶
Note that intermediate, progressive results and/or the final result MAY have different structure. The WAMP peer implementation is responsible for mapping everything into a form suitable for consumption in the host language.¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELDs
¶
[70, 87683, {"progress": true}, ["partial 1", 10]] [70, 87683, {"progress": true}, [], {"foo": 10, "bar": "partial 1"}] ... [70, 87683, {}, [1, 2, 3], {"moo": "hello"}]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULTs
¶
[50, 77133, {"progress": true}, ["partial 1", 10]] [50, 77133, {"progress": true}, [], {"foo": 10, "bar": "partial 1"}] ... [50, 77133, {}, [1, 2, 3], {"moo": "hello"}]¶
Even if a Caller has indicated its expectation to receive progressive results by setting CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool := true
, a Callee is not required to produce progressive results. CALL.Options.receive_progress
and INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress
are simply indications that the Caller is prepared to process progressive results, should there be any produced. In other words, Callees are free to ignore such receive_progress
hints at any time.¶
Caller Leaving¶
The Dealer's behavior for when a Caller leaves or disconnects during a progressive results call shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the Dealer sends an INTERRUPT to the Callee with mode="killnowait"
. See Caller Leaving During RPC Invocation under the Basic Profile.¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | -----------------> | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | | YIELD (progress)| | | <---------------- | | | | RESULT (progress)| | | <----------------- | ,--+---. | | |Caller| | | `------' | INTERRUPT | (gone) | ----------------> | | ,--+---. ,--+---. |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------'¶
Such cancellation when the caller leaves addresses a potential security vulnerability: In cases where progressive results are used to stream data to Callers, and network connectivity is unreliable, Callers may often get disconnected in the middle of receiving such progressive results. Without the mandated cancellation behavior, recurring connect-call-disconnect cycles by a Caller would result in a rapidly growing backlog of unprocessed streaming results, overloading the router and further degrading network connectivity.¶
Callee Leaving¶
The Dealer's behavior for when a Callee leaves or disconnects during a progressive results call shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the Dealer sends an ERROR message to the Caller with the wamp.error.canceled
URI. See Callee Leaving During an RPC Invocation under the Basic Profile.¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | -----------------> | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | | YIELD (progress)| | | <---------------- | | | | RESULT (progress)| | | <----------------| | | | ,--+---. | | |Callee| | | `------' | ERROR | (gone) | <--------------- | | | ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| `------' `------'¶
Ignoring Requests for Progressive Call Results¶
A Callee that does not support progressive results SHOULD ignore any INVOCATION.Details.receive_progress
flag.¶
A Callee that supports progressive results, but does not support call canceling is considered by the Dealer to not support progressive results.¶
Timeouts¶
When the Call Timeouts feature is used in combination with Progressive Call Results, the CALL.Options.timeout|integer
option shall represent the time limit between the initial call and the first result, and between results thereafter.¶
For Dealer-initiated timeouts, this corresponds to
- the time between receipt of the CALL
message and receipt of the first YIELD
message, and,
- the time between received YIELD
messages thereafter.¶
For Callee-initiated timeouts, this corresponds to
- the time between receipt of the INVOCATION
message and acquisition of the first result, and,
- the time between acquisition of successive results thereafter.¶
Note that for progressive results, the timeout value does not correspond to the duration of the complete call from initiation to the final result. The rationale for this is that it would be unfeasible to compute a reasonable timeout value for a call having a non-deterministic number of progressive results.¶
A Caller may issue a call having progressive invocations. This can be useful in a few cases:¶
In such cases, a procedure implemented by a Callee and registered at a Dealer may be made to receive progressive call invocations, where the Callee may start processing the incoming data without awaiting the entire set of payload chunks.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
)
and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.progressive_call_invocations|bool := true¶
Progressive call invocations can work only if all three peers support and announce this feature. In addition, Callees MUST announce support of the Call Cancelling feature via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.callee.features.call_cancelling|bool := true¶
As a consequence, Dealers MUST also announce support of the Call Cancelling feature via¶
WELCOME.Details.roles.dealer.features.call_cancelling|bool := true¶
The following cases, where a Caller sends a CALL
message with progress := true
, MUST be treated as protocol errors
with the underlying WAMP sessions being aborted:¶
HELLO
handshake.¶
HELLO
handshake.¶
Otherwise, in cases where the Caller sends a CALL
message with progress := true
but the Callee does not support
progressive call invocations or call cancelling, the call MUST be treated as an application error with the Dealer responding
to the Caller with the wamp.error.feature_not_supported
error message.¶
Message Flow¶
The message flow for a progressive call when a Callee waits for all chunks before processing and sending a single result:¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL (progress) | | | ----------------------> | | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | | ---------------------->| | CALL (progress) | | | ----------------------->| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | | ---------------------->| | | | | ... | ... | | | | | CALL (final) | | | ----------------------->| | | | INVOCATION (final) | | | ---------------------->| | | | | | YIELD (final) or ERROR | | | <----------------------| | | | | RESULT (final) or ERROR | | | <-----------------------| | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
As a progressive
call chunks are part of the same overall call, the Caller must send the same Request|id
for every CALL
and the Dealer must also use the same Request|id
with every INVOCATION
to the Callee.¶
A Caller indicates its willingness to issue a progressive call by setting¶
CALL.Options.progress|bool := true¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL
¶
[ 48, 77245, { "progress": true }, "com.myapp.get_country_by_coords", [50.450001, 30.523333] ]¶
If the Callee supports progressive call invocations, the Dealer shall forward the Caller's willingness to send progressive call invocations by setting¶
INVOCATION.Details.progress|bool := true¶
Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION
¶
[ 68, 35224, 379, { "progress": true }, [50.450001, 30.523333] ]¶
A call invocation MUST always end in a normal CALL
without the "progress": true
option, or explicitly
set "progress": false
which is the default.¶
Progressive Call Invocations and Shared Registration¶
RPCs can have a multiple registrations (see Shared Registration
feature) with different <invocation_policies>
.
However, allowing progressive CALL
messages to be routed to different Callees would lead to unexpected results.
To prevent this the Dealer MUST make a first INVOCATION
based on <invocation_policy>
and then route all
subsequent progressive
calls to the same Callee.¶
Caller Leaving¶
The Dealer's behavior for when a Caller leaves or disconnects during a call with progressive invocations shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the Dealer sends an INTERRUPT to the Callee with mode="killnowait"
. See Caller Leaving During RPC Invocation under the Basic Profile.¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL (progress) | | | ----------------->| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | | ---------------------->| | CALL (progress) | | | ----------------->| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | | ---------------------->| ,--+---. | | |Caller| | | `------' | | (gone) | | | INTERRUPT | | ---------------------->| | | ,--+---. ,--+---. |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------'¶
As in progressive call results, such cancellation when the caller leaves addresses a potential security vulnerability: In cases where progressive call invocations are used to stream data from a Caller, and network connectivity is unreliable, the Caller may often get disconnected in the middle of sending progressive data. This can lead to unneeded memory consumption for the Dealer and Callee, due to the need to store temporary metadata about ongoing calls.¶
Callee Leaving¶
The Dealer's behavior for when a Callee leaves or disconnects during a call with progressive invocations shall be the same as in a basic, non-progressive call. That is, the Dealer sends an ERROR message to the Caller with the wamp.error.canceled
URI. See Callee Leaving During an RPC Invocation under the Basic Profile.¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL (progress) | | | -----------------> | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | | ----------------------> | | | | | | | | ,--+---. | | |Callee| | ERROR | `------' | <--------------- | (gone) | | ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| `------' `------'¶
Continuations on Completed Calls¶
A call with progressive invocations is considered completed by the Dealer when the latter receives a correlated final YIELD or ERROR message from the Callee, or when the Callee leaves the realm.¶
Due to network delays, the Caller may be unaware that the call is completed by time it sends another progressive CALL continuation.¶
When a Dealer receives a CALL under the following conditions:¶
then it MUST ignore and discard that CALL message without any further correlated response to the Caller. The rationale for this is that the Caller will eventually receive a correlated RESULT or ERROR message from the previous call completion and will be able to handle the call completion accordingly.¶
The sequence diagram below illustrates this sitation, where the Network actor models network delay.¶
,------. ,-------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Network| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `---+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL #123 | | | | (progress) | | | | ------------> CALL #123 | | | | (progress) | | | | ------------> INVOCATION | | | | (progress) | | | | ------------> | CALL #123 | | | | (progress) | | ERROR | | ------------> | <-----------| | | ERROR | | | | <-----------| | | | ,---------. | | | | | Call | | | | | |Completed| | | | | `---------' | | | | | | | | CALL #123 | | | | (progress) | | | | ------------> | | | ,---------. | | | | | Ignored | | | | | `---------' | | | ERROR | | | | <-----------| | | | | | | ,--+---. ,---+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Network| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `-------' `------' `------'¶
From the Callee's perspective, a call with progressive invocations is considered completed when the Callee sends a correlated final YIELD or ERROR message.¶
Due to network delays, the Dealer may be unaware that the call is completed by time it sends another progressive INVOCATION.¶
When a Callee receives an INVOCATION under the following conditions:¶
then it MUST ignore and discard that INVOCATION message without any further correlated response to the Dealer. The rationale for this is that the Dealer will eventually receive a correlated YIELD or ERROR message from the Callee and then send a correlated RESULT or ERROR message to the Caller, thus the Caller and the Dealer will both be able to handle the call completion accordingly.¶
The sequence diagram below illustrates this sitation, where the Network actor models network delay.¶
,------. ,------. ,-------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Network| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `---+---' `--+---' | CALL #123 | | | | (progres) | | | | -----------> | | | | INVOCATION #42 | | | | (progress) | | | | ---------------> | | | | INVOCATION #42 | | | | (progress) | | | | ---------------> | CALL #123 | | | | (progress) | | ERROR | | -----------> | <--------------| | | INVOCATION #42 | | | | (progress) | | | | ---------------> | | | | INVOCATION #42 | | | | (progress) | | | ERROR | ---------------> | | <--------------| ,-------. | | ERROR | | |Ignored| | | <----------| | `---+---' | | | | | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,---+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Network| |Callee| `------' `------' `-------' `------'¶
Verification of CALL Request IDs¶
When sending a CALL that continues a progressive call, its request ID is the same as the CALL that initiated the progressive call invocation. Therefore, when progressive call invocations are enabled, request IDs from CALL messages may not appear sequential. For example:¶
[CALL, 1, {"progress":true}, "foo"]
¶
[CALL, 2, {}, "bar"]
¶
[CALL, 1, {}, "foo"]
(OK, continues CALL request #1)¶
The requirement for CALL request IDs to be sequential session scope (see Protocol Violations) must therefore only apply to new RPC transactions:¶
[CALL, 1, {"progress":true}, "foo"]
¶
[CALL, 2, {}, "bar"]
¶
[CALL, 4, {}, "baz"]
(protocol violation, request ID 3 expected)¶
Let us define watermark as the maximum valid request ID of all received CALL messages during a Dealer's run time.¶
Let us also define continuation candiate as a CALL with a request ID that is equal to or less than the watermark.¶
When a Dealer receives a CALL with a request ID that is exactly one above the watermark, then it shall be considered a new RPC transaction, and the requirement for sequential session scope IDs is verified.¶
When a Dealer receives a CALL with a request ID that is greater than one above the watermark, then this corresponds to a gap in the session scope ID sequence and MUST always be treated as a protocol violation.¶
When a Dealer receives a CALL with a request ID that is equal to or less than the watermark, then it is considered as a continuation candidate for a progressive invocation transfer.¶
As discussed in the previous section, a Caller may be unaware that a progressive invocation transfer is completed while sending a CALL continuation for that progressive invocation. Therefore, the Dealer cannot simply just check against progressive transfers in progress when verifying the validity of continuation candidates. It must also consider past progressive transfers that have been completed.¶
In order to validate the request ID of continuation candidates, it is suggested that a Dealer maintain a table of request IDs of completed progressive invocation transfers, where each entry is kept for a limited grace period. When a Dealer receives a continuation candidate with a request ID that is not in that table, nor in the list of active progressive invocations, then it is considered a protocol violation. Care must be taken in choosing the grace period: too short and data races can occur with slow networks, too long and memory usage of the table may become excessive when frequent progressive calls are made.¶
Due to resource constraints, it may not be desireable to implement such a grace period table, so Dealers MAY instead discard continuation candidates with request IDs that cannot be found in the list of active progressive invocation transfers.¶
The following pseudocode summarizes the algorithm for verifying CALL request IDs when progressive call invocations are enabled:¶
if (request_id == watermark + 1) watermark = watermak + 1 initiate_new_call() else if (request_id > watermark + 1) // Gap in request IDs abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation") else // Continuation candidate if (active_call_records.contains(request_id, procedure_uri)) record = active_call_records.at(request_id) if (record.is_progressive_invocation_call()) continue_call() else abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation") endif else if (strict_request_id_verification_enabled) if (grace_period_table.contains(request_id, procedure_uri)) discard_call() else abort_session("wamp.error.protocol_violation") endif else discard_call() endif endif¶
Ignoring Progressive Call Invocations¶
Unlike some other advanced features, a Callee cannot be unaware of progressive call invocations.
Therefore, if a Callee doesn't support this feature, the Dealer MUST respond to the Caller with an
wamp.error.feature_not_supported
error message.¶
A Callee that supports progressive call invocations, but does not support call canceling, shall be considered by the Dealer as not supporting progressive call invocations.¶
Progressive Call Invocations with Progressive Call Results¶
Progressive Call Invocations may be used in conjunction with Progressive Call Results if the Caller, Dealer, and Callee all support both features. This allows the Callee to start sending partial results back to the Caller after receiving one or more initial payload chunks. Efficient two-way streams between a Caller and Callee can be implemented this way.¶
The following message flow illustrates a call using progressive call invocations when a Callee starts sending progressive call
results immediately. Note that YIELD
messages don't need to be matched with CALL
/INVOCATION
messages.
For example, the caller can send a few CALL
messages before starting to receive RESULT
messages; they do not need
to be matched pairs.¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL (progress) | | |------------------------>| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | |----------------------->| | | | | | YIELD (progress) | | |<-----------------------| | | | | RESULT (progress) | | |<------------------------| | | | | | CALL (progress) | | |------------------------>| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | |----------------------->| | | | | CALL (progress) | | |------------------------>| | | | INVOCATION (progress) | | |----------------------->| | | YIELD (progress) | | |<-----------------------| | | | | RESULT (progress) | | |<------------------------| | | | | | | YIELD (progress) | | |<-----------------------| | | | | RESULT (progress) | | |<------------------------| | | | | | ... | ... | | | | | CALL (final) | | |------------------------>| | | | INVOCATION (final) | | |----------------------->| | | | | | YIELD (final) or ERROR | | |<-----------------------| | | | | RESULT (final) or ERROR | | |<------------------------| | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
Because they are part of the same call operation, the request ID is the same in all CALL
,
INVOCATION
, YIELD
, and ERROR
messages in the above exchange.¶
Freezing of Options in Progressive Call Invocations¶
Except for progress
, items in the Options
dictionary of the initiating progressive CALL
shall be effective for
the entirety of the progressive call request. Only the progress
option shall be considered by the Dealer in subsequent progressive call invocations
(within the same overall request). Except for progress
, items in the Details
dictionary of corresponding INVOCATION
messages shall be based on the initiating progressive CALL
only.¶
For example, if disclose_me=true
was specified in the initiating progressive call, all subsequent progressive call invocations
(within the same call) shall be considered by the Dealer to implictly have disclose_me=true
as well. That is, all
INVOCATION
messages associated with the overall request shall contain caller identify information.¶
Any option besides progress
SHOULD be omitted altogether by the Caller in subsequent progressive call invocations. Not having to repeat (and not being able to change) options is more in tune with the concept of a media stream where options are set up initially, and the source (Caller) only needs to keep uploading more data thereafter.¶
In subsequent call invocations:¶
progress
¶
progress
¶
Dealers and Callees are responsible for remembering the options of the initiating progressive CALL
.¶
For reference, here is a list of options that are frozen upon the initial progressive call invocations:¶
CALL.Options.disclose_me|bool
¶
CALL.Options.ppt_cipher|string
¶
CALL.Options.ppt_keyid|string
¶
CALL.Options.ppt_scheme|string
¶
CALL.Options.ppt_serializer|string
¶
CALL.Options.receive_progress|bool
¶
CALL.Options.rkey
¶
CALL.Options.runmode|string
¶
CALL.Options.timeout|integer
¶
These rules concerning progressive call invocation options also apply to custom options that are not part of this specification.¶
The Call Timeouts feature allows for automatic cancellation of a remote procedure call by the Dealer or Callee after a specified time duration.¶
A Caller specifies a timeout by providing¶
CALL.Options.timeout|integer¶
in milliseconds. Automatic call timeouts are deactivated if there is no timeout
option, or if its value is 0
.¶
Dealer-Initiated Timeouts¶
If the Callee does not support Call Timeouts, a Dealer supporting this feature MUST start a timeout timer upon receiving a CALL
message with a timeout
option. The message flow for call timeouts is identical to Call Canceling, except that there is no CANCEL
message that originates from the Caller. The cancellation mode is implicitly killnowait
if the Callee supports call cancellation, otherwise the cancellation mode is skip
.¶
The error message that is returned to the Caller MUST use wamp.error.timeout
as the reason URI.¶
Callee-Initiated Timeouts¶
If the Callee supports Call Timeouts, the Dealer MAY propagate the CALL.Options.timeout|integer
option via the INVOCATION
message and allow the Callee to handle the timeout logic. If the operation times out, the Callee MUST return an ERROR
message with wamp.error.timeout
as the reason URI.¶
Callees wanting to handle the timeout logic MAY specify this intention via the REGISTER.Options.forward_timeout|boolean
option. The Dealer, upon receiving a CALL with the timeout
option set, checks if the matching RPC registration had the forward_timeout
option set, then accordingly either forwards the timeout value or handles the timeout logic locally without forwarding the timeout value.¶
Dealers MAY choose to override the REGISTER.Options.forward_timeout|boolean
option based on router configuration. For example, if a Dealer is resource-constrained and does not wish to maintain a queue of pending call timeouts, it may decide to always forward the CALL timeout option to Callees.¶
Caller-Initiated Timeouts¶
Callers may run their own timeout timer and send a CANCEL
message upon timeout. This is permitted if the Dealer supports Call Canceling and is not considered to be a usage of the Call Timeouts feature.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Dealers (role := "dealer"
) and MAY be announced by Callees (role := "callee"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_timeout|bool := true¶
If a Callee does not support Call Timeouts, it may optionally announce support for Call Cancellation via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_canceling|bool := true¶
A Caller might want to actively cancel a call that was issued, but not has yet returned. An example where this is useful could be a user triggering a long running operation and later changing his mind or no longer willing to wait.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_canceling|bool := true¶
Message Flow¶
The message flow between Callers, a Dealer and Callees for canceling remote procedure calls involves the following messages:¶
A call may be canceled at the Callee or at the Dealer side. Cancellation behaves differently depending on the mode:¶
ERROR
is sent immediately back to the caller. No INTERRUPT
is sent to the callee and the result is discarded when received.¶
INTERRUPT
is sent to the callee, but ERROR
is not returned to the caller until after the callee has responded to the canceled call. In this case the caller may receive RESULT
or ERROR
depending whether the callee finishes processing the invocation or the interrupt first.¶
ERROR
is sent immediately back to the caller. INTERRUPT
is sent to the callee and any response to the invocation or interrupt from the callee is discarded when received.¶
If the callee does not support call canceling, then behavior is skip.¶
Message flow during call canceling when Callee supports this feature and mode is kill
¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | ----------------> | | | | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | CANCEL | | | ----------------> | | | | | | INTERRUPT | | | ----------------> | | | | | ERROR | | | <---------------- | | | | ERROR | | | <---------------- | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
Message flow during call canceling when Callee does not support this feature or mode is skip
¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | ----------------> | | | | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | | CANCEL | | | ----------------> | | | | | ERROR | | | <---------------- | | | | | | RESULT (skipped) | | | <---------------- | | | | | | or ERROR (skipped)| | | <----------------- ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
Message flow during call canceling when Callee supports this feature and mode is killnowait
¶
,------. ,------. ,------. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `--+---' `--+---' `--+---' | CALL | | | ----------------> | | | | | | INVOCATION | | | ----------------> | | | | CANCEL | | | ----------------> | | | | | ERROR | | | <---------------- | | | INTERRUPT | | | ----------------> | | | ,--+---. ,--+---. ,--+---. |Caller| |Dealer| |Callee| `------' `------' `------'¶
A Caller cancels a remote procedure call initiated (but not yet finished) by sending a CANCEL
message to the Dealer:¶
[CANCEL, CALL.Request|id, Options|dict]¶
A Dealer cancels an invocation of an endpoint initiated (but not yet finished) by sending a INTERRUPT
message to the Callee:¶
[INTERRUPT, INVOCATION.Request|id, Options|dict]¶
Options:¶
CANCEL.Options.mode|string == "skip" | "kill" | "killnowait"¶
Ignoring Results after Cancel¶
After the Dealer sends an INTERRUPT
when mode="killnowait", any responses from the Callee are ignored. This means that it is not necessary for the Callee to respond with an ERROR
message, when mode="killnowait", since the Dealer ignores it.¶
A CALLEE might not be able to attend to a call. This may be due to a multitude of reasons including, but not limited to:¶
A unavailable response allows for automatic reroute of a call by the Dealer without the CALLER ever having to know about it.¶
When such a situation occurs, the Callee responds to a INVOCATION
message with the error uri:¶
wamp.error.unavailable¶
When the Dealer receives the wamp.error.unavailable
message in response to an INVOCATION
, it will reroute the CALL
to another registration according to the rerouting rules of the invocation_policy
of the procedure
, as given below.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_reroute|bool := true¶
Rerouting Rules¶
The Dealer MUST adhere to the invocation policy
of the procedure
when rerouting the CALL
, while assuming that the unavailable
registration virtually does not exist.¶
For different invocation policy
the Dealer MUST follow:¶
Invocation Policy | Operation |
---|---|
single
|
Responds with a wamp.error.no_available_callee error message to the CALLER
|
roundrobin
|
Picks the next registration from the Registration Queue of the Procedure
|
random
|
Picks another registration at random from the Registration Queue of the Procedure, as long as it is not the same registration
|
first
|
Picks the registration which was registered after the called registration was registered |
last
|
Picks the registration which was registered right before the called registration was registered |
Failure Scenario¶
In case all available registrations of a Procedure responds with a wamp.error.unavailable
for a CALL, the Dealer MUST respond with a wamp.error.no_available_callee
to the CALLER¶
A Caller MAY request the disclosure of its identity (its WAMP session ID) to endpoints of a routed call via¶
CALL.Options.disclose_me|bool := true¶
Example¶
[48, 7814135, {"disclose_me": true}, "com.myapp.echo", ["Hello, world!"]]¶
If above call is issued by a Caller with WAMP session ID 3335656
, the Dealer sends an INVOCATION
message to Callee with the Caller's WAMP session ID in INVOCATION.Details.caller
:¶
Example¶
[68, 6131533, 9823526, {"caller": 3335656}, ["Hello, world!"]]¶
Note that a Dealer MAY disclose the identity of a Caller even without the Caller having explicitly requested to do so when the Dealer configuration (for the called procedure) is setup to do so.¶
Identity Information¶
When Caller disclosure is allowed for a particular CALL message, the
corresponding INVOCATION
message MUST contain an
INVOCATION.Details.caller|integer
property set to the Caller's session ID.¶
The following additional properties MAY also be included::¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. caller_identification|bool := true¶
Request Identification¶
A Dealer MAY deny a Caller's request to disclose its identity:¶
Example¶
[8, 48, 7814135, "wamp.error.disclose_me.not_allowed"]¶
A Callee MAY request the disclosure of caller identity via¶
REGISTER.Options.disclose_caller|bool := true¶
Example¶
[64, 927639114088448, {"disclose_caller":true}, "com.maypp.add2"]¶
With the above registration, the registered procedure is called with the caller's sessionID as part of the call details object.¶
A Dealer may be configured to automatically assign trust levels to calls issued by Callers according to the Dealer configuration on a per-procedure basis and/or depending on the application defined role of the (authenticated) Caller.¶
A Dealer supporting trust level will provide¶
INVOCATION.Details.trustlevel|integer¶
in an INVOCATION
message sent to a Callee. The trustlevel 0
means lowest trust, and higher integers represent (application-defined) higher levels of trust.¶
Example¶
[68, 6131533, 9823526, {"trustlevel": 2}, ["Hello, world!"]]¶
In above event, the Dealer has (by configuration and/or other information) deemed the call (and hence the invocation) to be of trustlevel 2
.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.call_trustlevels|bool := true¶
By default, Callees register procedures with exact matching policy. That is a call will only be routed to a Callee by the Dealer if the procedure called (CALL.Procedure
) exactly matches the endpoint registered (REGISTER.Procedure
).¶
A Callee might want to register procedures based on a pattern. This can be useful to reduce the number of individual registrations to be set up or to subscribe to a open set of topics, not known beforehand by the Subscriber.¶
If the Dealer and the Callee support pattern-based registrations, this matching can happen by¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. pattern_based_registration|bool := true¶
A Callee requests prefix-matching policy with a registration request by setting¶
REGISTER.Options.match|string := "prefix"¶
Example¶
[ 64, 612352435, { "match": "prefix" }, "com.myapp.myobject1" ]¶
When a prefix-matching policy is in place, any call with a procedure that has REGISTER.Procedure
as a prefix will match the registration, and potentially be routed to Callees on that registration.¶
In above example, the following calls with CALL.Procedure
¶
com.myapp.myobject1.myprocedure1
¶
com.myapp.myobject1-mysubobject1
¶
com.myapp.myobject1.mysubobject1.myprocedure1
¶
com.myapp.myobject1
¶
will all apply for call routing. A call with one of the following CALL.Procedure
¶
will not apply.¶
A Callee requests wildcard-matching policy with a registration request by setting¶
REGISTER.Options.match|string := "wildcard"¶
Wildcard-matching allows to provide wildcards for whole URI components.¶
Example¶
[ 64, 612352435, { "match": "wildcard" }, "com.myapp..myprocedure1" ]¶
In the above registration request, the 3rd URI component is empty, which signals a wildcard in that URI component position. In this example, calls with CALL.Procedure
e.g.¶
will all apply for call routing. Calls with CALL.Procedure
e.g.¶
com.myapp.myobject1.myprocedure1.mysubprocedure1
¶
com.myapp.myobject1.myprocedure2
¶
com.myapp2.myobject1.myprocedure1
¶
will not apply for call routing.¶
When a single call matches more than one of a Callees registrations, the call MAY be routed for invocation on multiple registrations, depending on call settings.¶
No set semantics¶
Since each Callee's' registrations "stands on its own", there is no set semantics implied by pattern-based registrations.¶
E.g. a Callee cannot register to a broad pattern, and then unregister from a subset of that broad pattern to form a more complex registration. Each registration is separate.¶
Calls matching multiple registrations¶
There can be situations, when some call URI matches more then one registration. In this case a call is routed to one and only one best matched RPC registration, or fails with ERROR wamp.error.no_such_procedure
.¶
The following algorithm MUST be applied to find a single RPC registration to which a call is routed:¶
a1.b2.c3.d4
registration a1.b2.c3
has higher priority than registration a1.b2
. If this match exists — (U+2014) use it.¶
a1.b2.c3.d4
registration a1.b2..d4
has higher priority than registration a1...d4
, see below for more complex examples. If this match exists — (U+2014) use it.¶
wamp.error.no_such_procedure
.¶
Examples¶
Registered RPCs: 1. 'a1.b2.c3.d4.e55' (exact), 2. 'a1.b2.c3' (prefix), 3. 'a1.b2.c3.d4' (prefix), 4. 'a1.b2..d4.e5', 5. 'a1.b2.c33..e5', 6. 'a1.b2..d4.e5..g7', 7. 'a1.b2..d4..f6.g7' Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c3.d4.e55' → exact match. Use RPC 1 Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c3.d98.e74' → no exact match, single prefix match. Use RPC 2 Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c3.d4.e325' → no exact match, 2 prefix matches (2,3), select longest one. Use RPC 3 Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c55.d4.e5' → no exact match, no prefix match, single wildcard match. Use RPC 4 Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c33.d4.e5' → no exact match, no prefix match, 2 wildcard matches (4,5), but RPC 5 has longer first portion (a1.b2.c33). Use RPC 5 Call request RPC URI: 'a1.b2.c88.d4.e5.f6.g7' → no exact match, no prefix match, 2 wildcard matches (6,7), both having equal first portions (a1.b2), but RPC 6 has longer second portion (d4.e5). Use RPC 6 Call request RPC URI: 'a2.b2.c2.d2.e2' → no exact match, no prefix match, no wildcard match. Return wamp.error.no_such_procedure¶
Concrete procedure called¶
If an endpoint was registered with a pattern-based matching policy, a Dealer MUST supply the original CALL.Procedure
as provided by the Caller in¶
INVOCATION.Details.procedure¶
to the Callee.¶
Example¶
[ 68, 6131533, 9823527, { "procedure": "com.myapp.procedure.proc1" }, ["Hello, world!"] ]¶
Feature status: sketch¶
Sharded Registrations are intended to allow calling a procedure which is offered by a sharded database, by routing the call to a single shard.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
) and Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.sharded_registration|bool := true¶
Write me.¶
If CALL.Options.runmode == "partition"
, then CALL.Options.rkey
MUST be present.¶
The call is then routed to all endpoints that were registered ..¶
The call is then processed as for "All" Calls.¶
Feature status: alpha¶
This feature allows a Dealer to actively revoke a previously granted registration. To achieve this, the existing UNREGISTERED message is extended as described below.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Callees (role := "callee") and Dealers (role := "dealer") via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. registration_revocation|bool := true¶
If the Callee does not support registration_revocation, the Dealer may still revoke a registration to support administrative functionality. In this case, the Dealer MUST NOT send an UNREGISTERED message to the Callee. The Callee MAY use the registration meta event wamp.registration.on_unregister
to determine whether a session is removed from a registration.¶
Extending UNREGISTERED¶
When revoking a registration, the router has no request ID to reply to. So it's set to zero and another argument is appended to indicate which registration to revoke. Optionally, a reason why the registration was revoked is also appended.¶
[UNREGISTERED, 0, Details|dict]¶
where¶
Details.registration|bool
MUST be a previously issued registration ID.¶
Details.reason|string
MAY provide a reason as to why the registration was revoked.¶
Example¶
[67, 0, {"registration": 1293722, "reason": "moving endpoint to other callee"}]¶
Subscriber Black- and Whitelisting is an advanced Broker feature where a Publisher is able to restrict the set of receivers of a published event.¶
Under normal Publish & Subscriber event dispatching, a Broker will dispatch a published event to all (authorized) Subscribers other than the Publisher itself. This set of receivers can be further reduced on a per-publication basis by the Publisher using Subscriber Black- and Whitelisting.¶
The Publisher can explicitly exclude Subscribers based on WAMP sessionid
, authid
or authrole
. This is referred to as Blacklisting.¶
A Publisher may also explicitly define a eligible list of Subscribers based on WAMP sessionid
, authid
or authrole
. This is referred to as Whitelisting.¶
Use Cases include the following.¶
Avoiding Callers from being self-notified¶
Consider an application that exposes a procedure to update a product price. The procedure might not only actually update the product price (e.g. in a backend database), but additionally publish an event with the updated product price, so that all application components get notified actively of the new price.¶
However, the application might want to exclude the originator of the product price update (the Caller of the price update procedure) from receiving the update event - as the originator naturally already knows the new price, and might get confused when it receives an update the Caller has triggered himself.¶
The product price update procedure can use PUBLISH.Options.exclude|list[int]
to exclude the Caller of the procedure.¶
Note that the product price update procedure needs to know the session ID of the Caller to be able to exclude him. For this, please see Caller Identification.¶
A similar approach can be used for other CRUD-like procedures.¶
Restricting receivers of sensitive information¶
Consider an application with users that have different authroles
, such as "manager" and "staff" that publishes events with updates to "customers". The topics being published to could be structured like¶
com.example.myapp.customer.<customer ID>¶
The application might want to restrict the receivers of customer updates depending on the authrole
of the user. E.g. a user authenticated under authrole
"manager" might be allowed to receive any kind of customer update, including personal and business sensitive information. A user under authrole
"staff" might only be allowed to receive a subset of events.¶
The application can publish all customer updates to the same topic com.example.myapp.customer.<customer ID>
and use PUBLISH.Options.eligible_authrole|list[string]
to safely restrict the set of actual receivers as desired.¶
Feature Definition¶
A Publisher may restrict the actual receivers of an event from the set of Subscribers through the use of¶
PUBLISH.Options.exclude
is a list of integers with WAMP sessionids
providing an explicit list of (potential) Subscribers that won't receive a published event, even though they may be subscribed. In other words, PUBLISH.Options.exclude
is a blacklist of (potential) Subscribers.¶
PUBLISH.Options.eligible
is a list of integers with WAMP WAMP sessionids
providing an explicit list of (potential) Subscribers that are allowed to receive a published event. In other words, PUBLISH.Options.eligible
is a whitelist of (potential) Subscribers.¶
The exclude_authid
, exclude_authrole
, eligible_authid
and eligible_authrole
options work similar, but not on the basis of WAMP sessionid
, but authid
and authrole
.¶
An (authorized) Subscriber to topic T will receive an event published to T if and only if all of the following statements hold true:¶
eligible
attribute present, the Subscriber's sessionid
is in this list¶
eligible_authid
attribute present, the Subscriber's authid
is in this list¶
eligible_authrole
attribute present, the Subscriber's authrole
is in this list¶
exclude attribute
present, the Subscriber's sessionid
is NOT in this list¶
exclude_authid
attribute present, the Subscriber's authid
is NOT in this list¶
exclude_authrole
attribute present, the Subscriber's authrole
is NOT in this list¶
For example, if both PUBLISH.Options.exclude
and PUBLISH.Options.eligible
are present, the Broker will dispatch events published only to Subscribers that are not explicitly excluded in PUBLISH.Options.exclude
and which are explicitly eligible via PUBLISH.Options.eligible
.¶
Example¶
[ 16, 239714735, { "exclude": [ 7891255, 1245751 ] }, "com.myapp.mytopic1", [ "Hello, world!" ] ]¶
The above event will get dispatched to all Subscribers of com.myapp.mytopic1
, but not WAMP sessions with IDs 7891255
or 1245751
(and also not the publishing session).¶
Example¶
[ 16, 239714735, { "eligible": [ 7891255, 1245751 ] }, "com.myapp.mytopic1", [ "Hello, world!" ] ]¶
The above event will get dispatched to WAMP sessions with IDs 7891255
or 1245751
only - but only if those are actually subscribed to the topic com.myapp.mytopic1
.¶
Example¶
[ 16, 239714735, { "eligible": [ 7891255, 1245751, 9912315 ], "exclude": [ 7891255 ] }, "com.myapp.mytopic1", [ "Hello, world!" ] ]¶
The above event will get dispatched to WAMP sessions with IDs 1245751
or 9912315
only, since 7891255
is excluded - but only if those are actually subscribed to the topic com.myapp.mytopic1
.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Publishers (role := "publisher"
) and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. subscriber_blackwhite_listing|bool := true¶
By default, a Publisher of an event will not itself receive an event published, even when subscribed to the Topic
the Publisher is publishing to. This behavior can be overridden using this feature.¶
To override the exclusion of a publisher from its own publication, the PUBLISH
message must include the following option:¶
PUBLISH.Options.exclude_me|bool¶
When publishing with PUBLISH.Options.exclude_me := false
, the Publisher of the event will receive that event, if it is subscribed to the Topic
published to.¶
Example¶
[ 16, 239714735, { "exclude_me": false }, "com.myapp.mytopic1", ["Hello, world!"] ]¶
In this example, the Publisher will receive the published event, if it is subscribed to com.myapp.mytopic1
.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Publishers (role := "publisher"
) and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publisher_exclusion|bool := true¶
A Publisher may request the disclosure of its identity (its WAMP session ID) to receivers of a published event by setting¶
PUBLISH.Options.disclose_me|bool := true¶
Example¶
[16, 239714735, {"disclose_me": true}, "com.myapp.mytopic1", ["Hello, world!"]]¶
If above event is published by a Publisher with WAMP session ID 3335656
, the Broker would send an EVENT
message to Subscribers with the Publisher's WAMP session ID in EVENT.Details.publisher
:¶
Example¶
[36, 5512315355, 4429313566, {"publisher": 3335656}, ["Hello, world!"]]¶
Note that a Broker may deny a Publisher's request to disclose its identity:¶
Example¶
[8, 16, 239714735, {}, "wamp.error.option_disallowed.disclose_me"]¶
A Broker may also (automatically) disclose the identity of a Publisher even without the Publisher having explicitly requested to do so when the Broker configuration (for the publication topic) is set up to do so.¶
Additional Identity Information¶
When publisher disclosure is allowed for a particular PUBLISH message, the
corresponding EVENT
message MAY also contain the following additional
properties in its Details
dictionary:¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Publishers (role := "publisher"
), Brokers (role := "broker"
) and Subscribers (role := "subscriber"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publisher_identification|bool := true¶
A Broker may be configured to automatically assign trust levels to events published by Publishers according to the Broker configuration on a per-topic basis and/or depending on the application defined role of the (authenticated) Publisher.¶
A Broker supporting trust level will provide¶
EVENT.Details.trustlevel|integer¶
in an EVENT
message sent to a Subscriber. The trustlevel 0
means lowest trust, and higher integers represent (application-defined) higher levels of trust.¶
Example¶
[36, 5512315355, 4429313566, {"trustlevel": 2}, ["Hello, world!"]]¶
In above event, the Broker has (by configuration and/or other information) deemed the event publication to be of trustlevel 2
.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Subscribers (role := "subscriber"
) and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. publication_trustlevels|bool := true¶
By default, Subscribers subscribe to topics with exact matching policy. That is an event will only be
dispatched to a Subscriber by the Broker if the topic published to (PUBLISH.Topic
) exactly matches the
topic subscribed to (SUBSCRIBE.Topic
).¶
A Subscriber might want to subscribe to topics based on a pattern. This can be useful to reduce the number of individual subscriptions to be set up and to subscribe to topics the Subscriber is not aware of at the time of subscription, or which do not yet exist at this time.¶
Let's review the event publication flow. When one peer decides to publish a message to a topic, it results in
a PUBLISH
WAMP message with fields for the Publication
id, Details
dictionary, and, optionally,
the payload arguments.¶
A given event received by the router from a publisher via a PUBLISH
message will match one or more
subscriptions:¶
The same published event is then forwarded to subscribers for every matching subscription. Thus, a given event might be sent multiple times to the same client under different subscriptions. Every subscription instance, based on a topic URI and some options, has a unique ID. All subscribers of the same subscription are given the same subscription ID.¶
+----------+ +------------+ +----------+ | | | Exact | |Subscriber| | |--Event-->|Subscription|---+--->| peer | | | +------------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | | +------------+ | +----------+ |Publisher | | Broker | | Wildcard | +--->|Subscriber| | peer |--Publication-->| |--Event-->|Subscription|---+--->| peer | +----------+ | | +------------+ | +----------+ | | +------------+ | +----------+ | | | Prefix | +--->|Subscriber| | |--Event-->|Subscription|------->| peer | +----------+ +------------+ +----------+¶
If the Broker and the Subscriber support pattern-based subscriptions, this matching can happen by¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Subscribers (role := "subscriber"
) and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. pattern_based_subscription|bool := true¶
A Subscriber requests prefix-matching policy with a subscription request by setting¶
SUBSCRIBE.Options.match|string := "prefix"¶
Example¶
[ 32, 912873614, { "match": "prefix" }, "com.myapp.topic.emergency" ]¶
When a prefix-matching policy is in place, any event with a topic that has SUBSCRIBE.Topic
as a prefix will match the subscription, and potentially be delivered to Subscribers on the subscription.¶
In the above example, events with PUBLISH.Topic
¶
com.myapp.topic.emergency.11
¶
com.myapp.topic.emergency-low
¶
com.myapp.topic.emergency.category.severe
¶
com.myapp.topic.emergency
¶
will all apply for dispatching. An event with PUBLISH.Topic
e.g. com.myapp.topic.emerge
will not apply.¶
A Subscriber requests wildcard-matching policy with a subscription request by setting¶
SUBSCRIBE.Options.match|string := "wildcard"¶
Wildcard-matching allows to provide wildcards for whole URI components.¶
Example¶
[ 32, 912873614, { "match": "wildcard" }, "com.myapp..userevent" ]¶
In above subscription request, the 3rd URI component is empty, which signals a wildcard in that URI component position. In this example, events with PUBLISH.Topic
¶
will all apply for dispatching. Events with PUBLISH.Topic
¶
will not apply for dispatching.¶
No set semantics¶
Since each Subscriber's subscription "stands on its own", there is no set semantics implied by pattern-based subscriptions.¶
E.g. a Subscriber cannot subscribe to a broad pattern, and then unsubscribe from a subset of that broad pattern to form a more complex subscription. Each subscription is separate.¶
Events matching multiple subscriptions¶
When a single event matches more than one of a Subscriber's subscriptions, the event will be delivered for each subscription.¶
The Subscriber can detect the delivery of that same event on multiple subscriptions via EVENT.PUBLISHED.Publication
, which will be identical.¶
Concrete topic published to¶
If a subscription was established with a pattern-based matching policy, a Broker MUST supply the original PUBLISH.Topic
as provided by the Publisher in¶
EVENT.Details.topic|uri¶
to the Subscribers.¶
Example¶
[ 36, 5512315355, 4429313566, { "topic": "com.myapp.topic.emergency.category.severe" }, ["Hello, world!"] ]¶
Feature status: alpha¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Publishers (role := "publisher"
), Subscribers (role := "subscriber"
) and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.shareded_subscriptions| bool := true¶
Resource keys: PUBLISH.Options.rkey|string
is a stable, technical resource key.¶
E.g. if your sensor has a unique serial identifier, you can use that.¶
Example¶
[16, 239714735, {"rkey": "sn239019"}, "com.myapp.sensor.sn239019. temperature", [33.9]]¶
Node keys: SUBSCRIBE.Options.nkey|string
is a stable, technical node key.¶
E.g. if your backend process runs on a dedicated host, you can use its hostname.¶
Example¶
[32, 912873614, {"match": "wildcard", "nkey": "node23"}, "com.myapp.sensor..temperature"]¶
Instead of complex QoS for message delivery, a Broker may provide Event History. With event history, a Subscriber is responsible for handling overlaps (duplicates) when it wants "exactly-once" message processing across restarts.¶
The event history may be transient, or it may be persistent where it survives Broker restarts.¶
The Broker implementation may allow for configuration of event history on a per-topic or per-topic-pattern basis. Such configuration could enable/disable the feature, set the event history storage location, set parameters for sub-features such as compression, or set the event history data retention policy.¶
Event History saves events published to discrete subscriptions, in the chronological order received by the broker. Let us examine an example.¶
Subscriptions:¶
Publication messages:¶
Event History:¶
Feature Announcement¶
A Broker that implements event history must indicate
HELLO.roles.broker.features.event_history = true
, must announce the role HELLO.roles.callee
,
and must provide the meta procedures described below.¶
Receiving Event History¶
A Caller can request message history by calling the Broker meta procedure¶
wamp.subscription.get_events¶
With payload:¶
Arguments
= [subscription|id]
. The subscription id for which to retrieve event history¶
ArgumentsKw
:¶
reverse
. Boolean. Optional. Traverses events in reverse order of occurrence.
The default is to traverse events in order of occurrence.¶
limit
. Positive integer. Optional. Indicates the maximum number of events to retrieve. Can be used for pagination.¶
from_time
. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring at the
given timestamp or after (using >=
comparison).¶
after_time
. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring after the
given timestamp (using >
comparison).¶
before_time
. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring before the
given timestamp (using <
comparison).¶
until_time
. RFC3339-formatted timestamp string. Optional. Only include publications occurring before the
given timestamp including date itself (using <=
comparison).¶
topic
. WAMP URI. Optional. For pattern-based subscriptions, only include publications to
the specified topic.¶
from_publication
. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred at or following the event with the given publication|id
(includes the event with the given publication|id
in the results).¶
after_publication
. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred following the event with the given publication_id
(excludes the event with the given publication|id
in the results).
Useful for pagination: pass the publication|id
attribute of the last event returned in the previous page of results when navigating in order of occurrence (reverse
argument absent or false).¶
before_publication
. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred previously to the event with the given publication|id
(excludes the event with the given publication|id
in the results).
Useful for pagination: pass the publication|id
attribute of the last event returned in the previous page of results when navigating in reverse order of occurrence (reverse=true
).¶
until_publication
. Positive integer. Optional. Events in the results must have occurred at or previously to the event with the given publication|id
(includes the event with the given publication|id
in the results).¶
It is possible to pass multiple options at the same time. In this case they will be treated as conditions with
logical AND
. Note that the publication|id
event attribute is not ordered as it belongs to the Global scope. But since events are
stored in the order they are received by the broker, it is possible to find an event with the specified publication|id
and then
return events including or excluding the matched one depending on the *_publication
filter attributes.¶
The arguments
payload field returned by the above RPC uses the same schema: an array of Event
objects containing
an additional timestamp
string attribute in RFC3339 format. It can also be an empty array in the case where there were no publications to the
specified subscription, or all events were filtered out by the specified criteria. Additional general information
about the query may be returned via the argumentsKw
payload field.¶
[ { "timestamp": "yyyy-MM-ddThh:mm:ss.SSSZ", // string with event date/time in RFC3339 format "subscription": 2342423, // The subscription ID of the event "publication": 32445235, // The original publication ID of the event "details": {}, // The original details of the event "args": [], // The original list arguments payload of the event. May be ommited "kwargs": {} // The original key-value arguments payload of the event. May be ommited } ]¶
Clients should not rely on timestamps being unique and monotonic. When events occur in quick succession, it's possible for some of them to have the same timestamp. When a router in an IoT system is deployed off-grid and is not synchronized to an NTP server, it's possible for the timestamps to jump backwards when the router's wall clock time or time zone is manually adjusted.¶
In cases where the events list is too large to send as a single RPC result, router implementations may provide additional options, such as pagination or returning progressive results.¶
As the Event History feature operates on subscription|id
, there can be situations when there are not yet any
subscribers to a topic of interest, but publications to the topic occur. In this situation, the Broker cannot
predict that events under that topic should be stored. If the Broker implementation allows configuration on
a per-topic basis, it may overcome this situations by preinitializing history-enabled topics with "dummy"
subscriptions even if there are not yet any real subscribers to those topics.¶
Sometimes, a client may not be willing to subscribe to a topic just for the purpose of obtaining a subscription id. In that case a client may use other Subscriptions Meta API RPC for retrieving subscription IDs by topic URIs if the router supports it.¶
Security Aspects¶
TODO/FIXME: This part of Event History needs more discussion and clarification. But at least provides some basic information to take into account.¶
In order to request event history, a peer must be allowed to subscribe to a desired subscription first. Thus, if a peer
cannot subscribe to a topic resulting in a subscription, it means that it cannot receive events history for that
topic either. To sidestep this problem, a peer must be allowed to call related meta procedures for obtaining the
event history as described above. Prohibited Event History meta procedure calls must fail with the
wamp.error.not_authorized
error URI.¶
Original publications may include additional options, such as black-white-listing
that triggers special event
processing. These same rules must also apply to event history requests. For example, if the original publication contains
eligible_authrole = 'admin'
, but the request for history came from a peer with authrole = 'user'
, then even if
user
is authorized to subscribe to the topic (and thus is authorized to ask for event history), this publication
must be filtered out from the results of this specific request, by the router side.¶
The black-white-listing
feature also allows the filtering of event delivery on a session ID
basis. In the context of
event history, this can result in unexpected behaviour: session ids are generated randomly at runtime for every
session establishment, so newly connected sessions asking for event history may receive events that were originally
excluded, or, vice versa, may not receive expected events due to session ID mismatch. To prevent this unexpected
behaviour, all events published with Options.exclude|list[int]
or Options.eligible|list[int]
should be ignored by
the Event History mechanism and not be saved at all.¶
Finally, Event History should only filter according to attributes that do not change during the run time of the router,
which are currently authrole
and authid
. Filtering based on ephemeral attributes like session ID
– (U+2013) and perhaps
other future custom attributes – (U+2013) should result in the event not being stored in the history at all, to avoid
unintentional leaking of event information.¶
Event Retention is where a particular topic has an event associated with it which is delivered upon an opting-in client subscribing to the topic.¶
It can be used for topics that generally have single or very few Publishers notifying Subscribers of a single updating piece of data -- for example, a topic where a sensor publishes changes of temperature & humidity in a data center. It may do this every time the data changes (making the time between updates potentially very far apart), which causes an issue for new Subscribers who may need the last-known value upon connection, rather than waiting an unknown period of time until it is updated. Event Retention covers this use case by allowing the Publisher to mark a event as 'retained', bound to the topic it was sent to, which can be delivered upon a new client subscription that asks for it. It is similar to Event History, but allows the publisher to decide what the most important recent event is on the topic, even if other events are being delivered.¶
A Broker that advertises support MAY provide event retention on topics it provides. This event retention SHOULD be provided on a best-effort basis, and MUST NOT be interpreted as permanent or reliable storage by clients. This event retention is limited to one event that all subscribers would receive, and MAY include other supplemental events that have limited distribution (for example, a event published with subscriber black/whitelisting).¶
A Publisher can request storage of a new Retained Event by setting Publish.Options.retain|bool
to true
.
Lack of the key in Publish.Options
MUST be interpreted as a false
value.
A Broker MAY decline to provide event retention on certain topics by ignoring the Publish.Options.retain
value.
Brokers that allow event retention on the given topic MUST set the topic Retained Event to this if it were eligible to be published on the topic.¶
Subscribers may request access to the Retained Event by setting Subscribe.Options.get_retained|bool
to true
.
Lack of the key in Subscribe.Options
MUST be interpreted as a false
value.
When they opt-in to receiving the Retained Event, the Broker MUST send the Subscriber the most recent Retained Event that they would have received if they were subscribing when it was published.
The Broker MUST NOT send the Subscriber a Retained Event that they would not be eligible to receive if they were subscribing when it was published.
The Retained Event, as sent to the subscribing client, MUST have Event.Details.retained|bool
set to true
, to inform subscribers that it is not an immediately new message.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
Welcome.Details.roles.broker.features.event_retention|bool := true¶
Feature status: alpha¶
This feature allows a Broker to actively revoke a previously granted subscription. To achieve this, the existing UNSUBSCRIBED message is extended as described below.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Subscribers (role := "subscriber") and Brokers (role := "broker") via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features. subscription_revocation|bool := true¶
If the Subscriber does not support subscription_revocation, the Broker MAY still revoke a subscription to
support administrative functionality. In this case, the Broker MUST NOT send an UNSUBSCRIBED
message to the Subscriber. The Subscriber MAY use the subscription meta event wamp.subscription.on_unsubscribe
to determine whether a session is removed from a subscription.¶
Extending UNSUBSCRIBED¶
When revoking a subscription, the router has no request ID to reply to. So it's set to zero and another argument is appended to indicate which subscription to revoke. Optionally, a reason why the subscription was revoked is also appended.¶
[UNSUBSCRIBED, 0, Details|dict]¶
where¶
Details.subscription|bool
MUST be a previously issued subscription ID.¶
Details.reason|string
MAY provide a reason as to why the subscription was revoked.¶
Example¶
[35, 0, {"subscription": 1293722, "reason": "no longer authorized"}]¶
When a WAMP client disconnects, or the WAMP session is destroyed, it may want to notify other subscribers or publish some fixed data. Since a client may disconnect uncleanly, this can't be done reliably by them. A Testament, however, set on the server, can be reliably sent by the Broker once either the WAMP session has detached or the client connection has been lost, and allows this functionality. It can be triggered when a Session is either detached (the client has disconnected from it, or frozen it, in the case of Session Resumption) or destroyed (when the WAMP session no longer exists on the server).¶
This allows clients that otherwise would not be able to know when other clients disconnect get a notification (for example, by using the WAMP Session Meta API) with a format the disconnected client chose.¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this feature MUST be announced by Dealers (role := "dealer"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.dealer.features. testament_meta_api|bool := true¶
Testament Meta Procedures¶
A Client can call the following procedures to set/flush Testaments:¶
wamp.session.add_testament
to add a Testament which will be published on a particular topic when the Session is detached or destroyed.¶
wamp.session.flush_testaments
to remove the Testaments for that Session, either for when it is detached or destroyed.¶
wamp.session.add_testament¶
Adds a new testament:¶
Positional arguments¶
topic|uri
- the topic to publish the event on¶
args|list
- positional arguments for the event¶
kwargs|dict
- keyword arguments for the event¶
Keyword arguments¶
publish_options|dict
- options for the event when it is published -- see Publish.Options
. Not all options may be honoured (for example, acknowledge
). By default, there are no options.¶
scope|string
- When the testament should be published. Valid values are detached
(when the WAMP session is detached, for example, when using Event Retention) or destroyed
(when the WAMP session is finalized and destroyed on the Broker). Default MUST be destroyed
.¶
wamp.session.add_testament
does not return a value.¶
wamp.session.flush_testaments¶
Removes testaments for the given scope:¶
Keyword arguments¶
scope|string
- Which set of testaments to be removed. Valid values are the same as wamp.session.add_testament
, and the default MUST be destroyed
.¶
wamp.session.flush_testaments
does not return a value.¶
Testaments in Use¶
A Client that wishes to send some form of data when their Session ends unexpectedly or their Transport becomes lost can set a testament using the WAMP Testament Meta API, when a Router supports it.
For example, a client may call add_testament
(this example uses the implicit scope
option of destroyed
):¶
yield self.call('wamp.session.add_testament', 'com.myapp.mytopic', ['Seeya!'], {'my_name': 'app1'})¶
The Router will then store this information on the WAMP Session, either in a detached
or destroyed
bucket, in the order they were added.
A client MUST be able to set multiple testaments per-scope.
If the Router does not support Session Resumption (therefore removing the distinction between a detached and destroyed session), it MUST still use these two separate buckets to allow wamp.session.flush_testaments
to work.¶
When a Session is detached, the Router will inspect it for any Testaments in the detached
scope, and publish them in the order that the Router received them, on the specified topic, with the specified arguments, keyword arguments, and publish options.
The Router MAY ignore publish options that do not make sense for a Testament (for example, acknowledged publishes).¶
When a Session is going to be destroyed, the Router will inspect it for any Testaments in the destroyed
scope, and publish them in the same way as it would for the detached
scope, in the order that they were received.¶
A Router that does not allow Session Resumption MUST send detached
-scope Testaments before destroyed
-scope Testaments.¶
A Client can also clear testaments if the information is no longer relevant (for example, it is shutting down completely cleanly).
For example, a client may call wamp.session.flush_testaments
:¶
yield self.call('wamp.session.flush_testaments', scope='detached') yield self.call('wamp.session.flush_testaments', scope='destroyed')¶
The Router will then flush all Testaments stored for the given scope.¶
Authentication is a complex area. Some applications might want to leverage authentication information coming from the transport underlying WAMP, e.g. HTTP cookies or TLS certificates.¶
Some transports might imply trust or implicit authentication by their very nature, e.g. Unix domain sockets with appropriate file system permissions in place.¶
Other application might want to perform their own authentication using external mechanisms (completely outside and independent of WAMP).¶
Some applications might want to perform their own authentication schemes by using basic WAMP mechanisms, e.g. by using application-defined remote procedure calls.¶
And some applications might want to use a transport independent scheme, nevertheless predefined by WAMP.¶
WAMP-level Authentication¶
The message flow between Clients and Routers for establishing and tearing down sessions MAY involve the following messages which authenticate a session:¶
,------. ,------. |Client| |Router| `--+---' `--+---' | HELLO | | ----------------> | | | CHALLENGE | | <---------------- | | | AUTHENTICATE | | ----------------> | | | WELCOME or ABORT| | <---------------- ,--+---. ,--+---. |Client| |Router| `------' `------'¶
Concrete use of CHALLENGE
and AUTHENTICATE
messages depends on the specific authentication method.¶
See WAMP Challenge-Response Authentication or ticket authentication for the use in these authentication methods.¶
If two-factor authentication is desired, then two subsequent rounds of CHALLENGE
and RESPONSE
may be employed.¶
CHALLENGE¶
An authentication MAY be required for the establishment of a session. Such requirement MAY be based on the Realm
the connection is requested for.¶
To request authentication, the Router MUST send a CHALLENGE
message to the Endpoint.¶
[CHALLENGE, AuthMethod|string, Extra|dict]¶
AUTHENTICATE¶
In response to a CHALLENGE
message, the Client MUST send an AUTHENTICATE
message.¶
[AUTHENTICATE, Signature|string, Extra|dict]¶
If the authentication succeeds, the Router MUST send a WELCOME
message, else it MUST send an ABORT
message.¶
Transport-level Authentication¶
Cookie-based Authentication¶
When running WAMP over WebSocket, the transport provides HTTP client cookies during the WebSocket opening handshake. The cookies can be used to authenticate one peer (the client) against the other (the server). The other authentication direction cannot be supported by cookies.¶
This transport-level authentication information may be forwarded to the WAMP level within HELLO.Details.transport.auth|any
in the client-to-server direction.¶
TLS Certificate Authentication¶
When running WAMP over a TLS (either secure WebSocket or raw TCP) transport, a peer may authenticate to the other via the TLS certificate mechanism. A server might authenticate to the client, and a client may authenticate to the server (TLS client-certificate based authentication).¶
This transport-level authentication information may be forwarded to the WAMP level within HELLO.Details.transport.auth|any
in both directions (if available).¶
With Ticket-based authentication, the client needs to present the server an authentication "ticket" - some magic value to authenticate itself to the server.¶
This "ticket" could be a long-lived, pre-agreed secret (e.g. a user password) or a short-lived authentication token (like a Kerberos token). WAMP does not care or interpret the ticket presented by the client.¶
Caution: This scheme is extremely simple and flexible, but the resulting security may be limited. E.g., the ticket value will be sent over the wire. If the transport WAMP is running over is not encrypted, a man-in-the-middle can sniff and possibly hijack the ticket. If the ticket value is reused, that might enable replay attacks.¶
A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO
message specifying the ticket
method as (one of) the authentication methods:¶
[1, "realm1", { "roles": ..., "authmethods": ["ticket"], "authid": "joe" } ]¶
The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list
is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For Ticket-based, this MUST include "ticket"
.¶
The HELLO.Details.authid|string
is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For Ticket-based authentication, this MUST be provided.¶
If the server is unwilling or unable to perform Ticket-based authentication, it'll either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an ABORT
message.¶
If the server is willing to let the client authenticate using a ticket and the server recognizes the provided authid
, it'll send a CHALLENGE
message:¶
[4, "ticket", {}]¶
The client will send an AUTHENTICATE
message containing a ticket:¶
[5, "secret!!!", {}]¶
The server will then check if the ticket provided is permissible (for the authid
given).¶
If the authentication succeeds, the server will finally respond with a WELCOME
message:¶
[2, 3251278072152162, { "authid": "joe", "authrole": "user", "authmethod": "ticket", "authprovider": "static", "roles": ... } ]¶
where¶
authid|string
: The authentication ID the client was (actually) authenticated as.¶
authrole|string
: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.¶
authmethod|string
: The authentication method, here "ticket"
¶
authprovider|string
: The actual provider of authentication. For Ticket-based authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static
or dynamic
.¶
The WELCOME.Details
again contain the actual authentication information active. If the authentication fails, the server will response with an ABORT
message.¶
WAMP Challenge-Response ("WAMP-CRA") authentication is a simple, secure authentication mechanism using a shared secret. The client and the server share a secret. The secret never travels the wire, hence WAMP-CRA can be used via non-TLS connections. The actual pre-sharing of the secret is outside the scope of the authentication mechanism.¶
A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO
message specifying the wampcra
method as (one of) the authentication methods:¶
[1, "realm1", { "roles": ..., "authmethods": ["wampcra"], "authid": "peter" } ]¶
The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list
is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For WAMP-CRA, this MUST include "wampcra"
.¶
The HELLO.Details.authid|string
is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For WAMP-CRA, this MUST be provided.¶
If the server is unwilling or unable to perform WAMP-CRA authentication, it MAY either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an ABORT
message.¶
If the server is willing to let the client authenticate using WAMP-CRA, and the server recognizes the provided authid
, it MUST send a CHALLENGE
message:¶
[4, "wampcra", { "challenge": "{ \"nonce\": \"LHRTC9zeOIrt_9U3\", \"authprovider\": \"userdb\", \"authid\": \"peter\", \"timestamp\": \"2014-06-22T16:36:25.448Z\", \"authrole\": \"user\", \"authmethod\": \"wampcra\", \"session\": 3251278072152162}" } ]¶
The CHALLENGE.Details.challenge|string
is a string the client needs to create a signature for. The string MUST BE a JSON serialized object which MUST contain:¶
authid|string
: The authentication ID the client will be authenticated as when the authentication succeeds.¶
authrole|string
: The authentication role the client will be authenticated as when the authentication succeeds.¶
authmethod|string
: The authentication methods, here "wampcra"
¶
authprovider|string
: The actual provider of authentication. For WAMP-CRA, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. userdb
.¶
nonce|string
: A random value.¶
timestamp|string
: The UTC timestamp (ISO8601 format) the authentication was started, e.g. 2014-06-22T16:51:41.643Z
.¶
session|int
: The WAMP session ID that will be assigned to the session once it is authenticated successfully.¶
The client needs to compute the signature as follows:¶
signature := HMAC[SHA256]_{secret} (challenge)¶
That is, compute the HMAC-SHA256 using the shared secret
over the challenge
.¶
After computing the signature, the client will send an AUTHENTICATE
message containing the signature, as a base64-encoded string:¶
[5, "gir1mSx+deCDUV7wRM5SGIn/+R/ClqLZuH4m7FJeBVI=", {}]¶
The server will then check if¶
If the authentication succeeds, the server will finally respond with a WELCOME
message:¶
[2, 3251278072152162, { "authid": "peter", "authrole": "user", "authmethod": "wampcra", "authprovider": "userdb", "roles": ... } ]¶
The WELCOME.Details
again contain the actual authentication information active.¶
If the authentication fails, the server will response with an ABORT
message.¶
Server-side Verification¶
The challenge sent during WAMP-CRA contains¶
nonce
) to make WAMP-CRA robust against replay attacks¶
timestamp
) to allow WAMP-CRA timeout on authentication requests that took too long¶
session
) to bind the authentication to a WAMP session ID¶
authid
and authrole
¶
Three-legged Authentication¶
The signing of the challenge sent by the server usually is done directly on the client. However, this is no strict requirement.¶
E.g. a client might forward the challenge to another party (hence the "three-legged") for creating the signature. This can be used when the client was previously already authenticated to that third party, and WAMP-CRA should run piggy packed on that authentication.¶
The third party would, upon receiving a signing request, simply check if the client is already authenticated, and if so, create a signature for WAMP-CRA.¶
In this case, the secret is actually shared between the WAMP server who wants to authenticate clients using WAMP-CRA and the third party server, who shares a secret with the WAMP server.¶
This scenario is also the reason the challenge sent with WAMP-CRA is not simply a random value, but a JSON serialized object containing sufficient authentication information for the third party to check.¶
Password Salting¶
WAMP-CRA operates using a shared secret. While the secret is never sent over the wire, a shared secret often requires storage of that secret on the client and the server - and storing a password verbatim (unencrypted) is not recommended in general.¶
WAMP-CRA allows the use of salted passwords following the PBKDF2 key derivation scheme. With salted passwords, the password itself is never stored, but only a key derived from the password and a password salt. This derived key is then practically working as the new shared secret.¶
When the password is salted, the server will during WAMP-CRA send a CHALLENGE
message containing additional information:¶
[4, "wampcra", { "challenge": "{ \"nonce\": \"LHRTC9zeOIrt_9U3\", \"authprovider\": \"userdb\", \"authid\": \"peter\", \"timestamp\": \"2014-06-22T16:36:25.448Z\", \"authrole\": \"user\", \"authmethod\": \"wampcra\", \"session\": 3251278072152162}", "salt": "salt123", "keylen": 32, "iterations": 1000 } ]¶
The CHALLENGE.Details.salt|string
is the password salt in use. The CHALLENGE.Details.keylen|int
and CHALLENGE.Details.iterations|int
are parameters for the PBKDF2 algorithm.¶
The WAMP Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism ("WAMP-SCRAM"), is a password-based authentication method where the shared secret is neither transmitted nor stored as cleartext. WAMP-SCRAM is based on RFC5802 (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) and RFC7677 (SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS).¶
WAMP-SCRAM supports the Argon2 (draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2) password-based key derivation function, a memory-hard algorithm intended to resist cracking on GPU hardware. PBKDF2 (RFC2898) is also supported for applications that are required to use primitives currently approved by cryptographic standards.¶
Security Considerations¶
With WAMP-SCRAM, if the authentication database is stolen, an attacker cannot impersonate a user unless they guess the password offline by brute force.¶
In the event that the server's authentication database is stolen, and the attacker either eavesdrops on one authentication exchange or impersonates a server, the attacker gains the ability to impersonate that particular user on that server. If the same salt is used on other servers, the attacker would gain the ability to impersonate that user on all servers using the same salt. That's why it's important to use a per-user random salt.¶
An eavesdropper that captures a user authentication exchange has enough information to mount an offline, brute-force dictionary attack for that particular user. If passwords are sufficiently strong, the cost/time needed to crack a password becomes prohibitive.¶
Note that when HTML/JavaScript assets are served to a web browser, WAMP-SCRAM does not safeguard against a man-in-the-middle tampering with those assets. Those assets could be tampered with in a way that captures the user's password and sends it to the attacker.¶
In light of the above security concerns, a secure TLS transport is therefore advised to prevent such attacks. The channel binding feature of SCRAM can be used to ensure that the TLS endpoints are the same between client and router.¶
Deviations from RFC5802¶
To simplify parsing, SCRAM attributes in the authentication exchange messages are encoded as members of the Options
/Details
objects without escaping the ,
and =
characters. However, the AuthMessage
used to compute the client and server signatures DOES use the exact syntax specified in RFC5802, section 7. This makes it possible to use existing test vectors to verify WAMP-SCRAM implementations.¶
Hashing based on the weaker SHA-1 specified in RFC5802 is intentionally not supported by WAMP-SCRAM, in favor of the stronger SHA-256 specified in RFC7677.¶
The Argon2 key derivation function MAY be used instead of PBKDF2.¶
Nonces are required to be base64-encoded, which is stricter than the printable
syntax specification of RFC5802.¶
The "y"
channel binding flag is not used as there is currently no standard way for WAMP routers to announce channel binding capabilities.¶
The use of authzid
for user impersonation is not supported.¶
authmethod Type String¶
"wamp-scram"
SHALL be used as the authmethod
type string for WAMP-SCRAM authentication. Announcement by routers of WAMP-SCRAM support is outside the scope of this document.¶
Base64 encoding¶
Base64 encoding of octet strings is restricted to canonical form with no whitespace, as defined in RFC4648 (The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings).¶
Nonces¶
In WAMP-SCRAM, a nonce (number used once) is a base64-encoded sequence of random octets. It SHOULD be of sufficient length to make a replay attack unfeasible. A length of 16 octets (128 bits) is recommended for each of the client and server-generated nonces.¶
See RFC4086 (Randomness Requirements for Security) for best practices concerning randomness.¶
Salts¶
A salt is a base64-encoded sequence of random octets.¶
To prevent rainbow table attacks in the event of database theft, the salt MUST be generated randomly by the server for each user. The random salt is stored with each user record in the authentication database.¶
Username/Password String Normalization¶
Username and password strings SHALL be normalized according to the SASLprep profile described in RFC4013, using the stringprep algorithm described in RFC3454.¶
While SASLprep preserves the case of usernames, the server MAY choose to perform case insensitive comparisons when searching for a username in the authentication database.¶
Channel Binding¶
Channel binding is a feature that allows a higher layer to establish that the other end of an underlying secure channel is bound to its higher layer counterpart. See RFC5056 (On the Use of Channel Bindings) for an in-depth discussion.¶
RFC5929 defines binding types for use with TLS transports, of which tls-unique
and tls-server-end-point
are applicable for WAMP-SCRAM. For each channel binding type, there is a corresponding definition of the channel binding data that must be sent in response to the authentication challenge.¶
Negotiation and announcement of channel binding is outside the scope of this document. RFC5929 section 6 recommends that application protocols use tls-unique
exclusively, except perhaps where server-side proxies are commonly deployed.¶
Note that WAMP-SCRAM channel binding is not generally possible with web browser clients due to the lack of a suitable API for this purpose.¶
The tls-unique Channel Binding Type¶
The tls-unique
channel binding type allows the WAMP layer to establish that the other peer is authenticating over the same, unique TLS connection. The channel binding data for this type corresponds to the bytes of the first TLS Finished message, as described in RFC5929, section 3. RFC5929 section 10.2 addresses the concern of disclosing this data over the TLS channel (in short, the TLS Finished message would already be visible to eavesdroppers).¶
To safeguard against the triple handshake attack described in RFC7627, this channel binding type MUST be used over a TLS channel that uses the extended master secret extension, or over a TLS channel where session resumption is not permitted.¶
The tls-server-end-point Channel Binding Type¶
The tls-server-end-point
channel binding type allows the WAMP layer to establish that the other peer is authenticating over a TLS connection to a server having been issued a Public Key Infrastructure Certificate. The channel binding data for this type is a hash of the TLS server's certificate, computed as described in RFC5929, section 4.1. The certificate is hashed to accommodate memory-constrained implementations.¶
Authentication Exchange¶
WAMP-SCRAM uses a single round of challenge/response pairs after the client authentication request and before the authentication outcome.¶
The mapping of RFC5802 messages to WAMP messages is as follows:¶
SCRAM Message | WAMP Message |
---|---|
client-first-message
|
HELLO
|
server-first-message
|
CHALLENGE
|
client-final-message
|
AUTHENTICATE
|
server-final-message with verifier
|
WELCOME
|
server-final-message with server-error
|
ABORT
|
Initial Client Authentication Message¶
WAMP-SCRAM authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO
message specifying the wamp-scram
method as (one of) the authentication methods:¶
[1, "realm1", { "roles": ..., "authmethods": ["wamp-scram"], "authid": "user", "authextra": { "nonce": "egVDf3DMJh0=", "channel_binding": null } } ]¶
where:¶
authid|string
: The identity of the user performing authentication. This corresponds to the username
parameter in RFC5802.¶
authextra.nonce|string
: A base64-encoded sequence of random octets, generated by the client. See Nonces.¶
authextra.channel_binding|string
: Optional string containing the desired channel binding type. See Channel Bindings.¶
Upon receiving the HELLO
message, the server MUST terminate the authentication process by sending an ABORT
message under any of the following circumstances:¶
authmethods
, and there are no other methods left that the server supports for this authid
.¶
channel_binding
type.¶
authid
. In this case, the server MAY proceed with a mock CHALLENGE
message to avoid leaking information on the existence of usernames. This mock CHALLENGE
SHOULD contain a generated salt
value that is always the same for a given authid
, otherwise an attacker may discover that the user doesn't actually exist.¶
Initial Server Authentication Message¶
If none of the above failure conditions apply, and the server is ready to let the client authenticate using WAMP-SCRAM, then it SHALL send a CHALLENGE
message:¶
[4, "wamp-scram", { "nonce": "egVDf3DMJh0=SBmkFIh7sSo=", "salt": "aBc+fx0NAVA=", "kdf": "pbkdf2", "iterations": 4096, "memory": null } ]¶
where:¶
nonce|string
: A server-generated nonce that is appended to the client-generated nonce sent in the previous HELLO
message. See Nonces.¶
salt|string
: The base64-encoded salt for this user, to be passed to the key derivation function. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database. See Salts.¶
kdf
: The key derivation function (KDF) used to hash the password. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database. See Key Derivation Functions.¶
iterations|integer
: The execution time cost factor to use for generating the SaltedPassword
hash. This value is stored with each user record in the authentication database.¶
memory|integer
: The memory cost factor to use for generating the SaltedPassword
hash. This is only used by the Argon2 key derivation function, where it is stored with each user record in the authentication database.¶
The client MUST respond with an ABORT message if CHALLENGE.Details.nonce
does not begin with the client nonce sent in HELLO.Details.nonce
.¶
The client SHOULD respond with an ABORT message if it detects that the cost parameters are unusually low. Such low-cost parameters could be the result of a rogue server attempting to obtain a weak password hash that can be easily cracked. What constitutes unusually low parameters is implementation-specific and is not covered by this document.¶
Final Client Authentication Message¶
Upon receiving a valid CHALLENGE
message, the client SHALL respond with an AUTHENTICATE
message:¶
[5, "dHzbZapWIk4jUhN+Ute9ytag9zjfMHgsqmmiz7AndVQ=", { "nonce": "egVDf3DMJh0=SBmkFIh7sSo=", "channel_binding": null, "cbind_data": null } ]¶
where:¶
Signature|string
argument: The base64-encoded ClientProof
, computed as described in the SCRAM-Algorithms section.¶
nonce|string
: The concatenated client-server nonce from the previous CHALLENGE
message.¶
channel_binding|string
: Optional string containing the channel binding type that was sent in the original HELLO
message.¶
cbind_data|string
: Optional base64-encoded channel binding data. MUST be present if and only if channel_binding
is not null
. The format of the binding data is dependent on the binding type. See Channel Binding.¶
Upon receiving the AUTHENTICATE
message, the server SHALL then check that:¶
AUTHENTICATE
message was received in due time.¶
ClientProof
passed via the Signature|string
argument is validated against the StoredKey
and ServerKey
stored in the authentication database. See SCRAM Algorithms.¶
nonce
matches the one previously sent via CHALLENGE
.¶
channel_binding
matches the one sent in the HELLO
message.¶
cbind_data
sent by the client matches the channel binding data that the server sees on its side of the channel.¶
Final Server Authentication Message - Success¶
If the authentication succeeds, the server SHALL finally respond with a WELCOME
message:¶
[2, 3251278072152162, { "authid": "user", "authrole": "frontend", "authmethod": "wamp-scram", "authprovider": "static", "roles": ..., "authextra": { "verifier": "v=6rriTRBi23WpRR/wtup+mMhUZUn/dB5nLTJRsjl95G4=" } } ]¶
where:¶
authid|string
: The authentication ID the client was actually authenticated as.¶
authrole|string
: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.¶
authmethod|string
: The authentication method, here "wamp-scram"
.¶
authprovider|string
: The actual provider of authentication. For WAMP-SCRAM authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static or dynamic.¶
authextra.verifier|string
: The base64-encoded ServerSignature
, computed as described in the SCRAM Algorithms section.¶
The client SHOULD check the verifier
for mutual authentication, terminating the session if invalid.¶
Final Server Authentication Message - Failure¶
If the authentication fails, the server SHALL respond with an ABORT
message.¶
The server MAY include a SCRAM-specific error string in the ABORT
message as a Details.scram
attribute. SCRAM error strings are listed in RFC5802, section 7, under server-error-value
.¶
SCRAM Algorithms¶
This section is non-normative.¶
RFC5802 specifies the algorithms used to compute the ClientProof
, ServerSignature
, ServerKey
, and StoredKey
values referenced by this document. Those algorithms are summarized here in pseudocode for reference.¶
Notation¶
"="
: The variable on the left-hand side is the result of the expression on the right-hand side.¶
"+"
: String concatenation.¶
IfNull(attribute, value, else)
: If the given attribute
is absent or null, evaluates to the given value
, otherwise evaluates to the given else
value.¶
Decimal(integer)
: The decimal string representation of the given integer
.¶
Base64(octets)
: Base64 encoding of the given octet sequence, restricted to canonical form with no whitespace, as defined in RFC4648.¶
UnBase64(str)
: Decode the given Base64 string into an octet sequence.¶
Normalize(str)
: Normalize the given string using the SASLprep profile RFC4013 of the "stringprep" algorithm RFC3454.¶
XOR
: The exclusive-or operation applied to each octet of the left and right-hand-side octet sequences.¶
SHA256(str)
: The SHA-256 cryptographic hash function.¶
HMAC(key, str)
: Keyed-hash message authentication code, as defined in RFC2104, with SHA-256 as the underlying hash function.¶
KDF(str, salt, params...)
: One of the supported key derivations function, with the output key length the same as the SHA-256 output length (32 octets). params...
are the additional parameters that are applicable for the function: iterations
and memory
.¶
Escape(str)
: Replace every occurrence of ",
" and "=
" in the given string with "=2C
" and "=3D
" respectively.¶
Data Stored on the Server¶
For each user, the server needs to store:¶
"argon2id13"
). This is needed to handle future revisions of the KDF, as well as allowing migration to stronger KDFs that may be added to WAMP-SCRAM in the future. This may also be needed if the KDF used during user registration is configurable or selectable on a per-user basis.¶
iterations
and possibly memory
.¶
StoredKey
.¶
ServerKey
.¶
where StoredKey
and ServerKey
are computed as follows:¶
SaltedPassword = KDF(Normalize(password), salt, params...) ClientKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key") StoredKey = SHA256(ClientKey) ServerKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key")¶
Note that "Client Key"
and "Server Key"
are string literals.¶
The manner in which the StoredKey
and ServerKey
are shared with the server during user registration is outside the scope of SCRAM and this document.¶
AuthMessage¶
In SCRAM, AuthMessage
is used for computing ClientProof
and ServerSignature
. AuthMessage
is computed using attributes that were sent in the first three messages of the authentication exchange.¶
ClientFirstBare = "n=" + Escape(HELLO.Details.authid) + "," + "r=" + HELLO.Details.authextra.nonce ServerFirst = "r=" + CHALLENGE.Details.nonce + "," + "s=" + CHALLENGE.Details.salt + "," + "i=" + Decimal(CHALLENGE.Details.iterations) CBindName = AUTHENTICATE.Extra.channel_binding CBindData = AUTHENTICATE.Extra.cbind_data CBindFlag = IfNull(CBindName, "n", "p=" + CBindName) CBindInput = CBindFlag + ",," + IfNull(CBindData, "", UnBase64(CBindData)) ClientFinalNoProof = "c=" + Base64(CBindInput) + "," + "r=" + AUTHENTICATE.Extra.nonce AuthMessage = ClientFirstBare + "," + ServerFirst + "," + ClientFinalNoProof¶
ClientProof¶
ClientProof
is computed by the client during the authentication exchange as follows:¶
SaltedPassword = KDF(Normalize(password), salt, params...) ClientKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key") StoredKey = SHA256(ClientKey) ClientSignature = HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage) ClientProof = ClientKey XOR ClientSignature¶
The ClientProof
is then sent to the server, base64-encoded, via the AUTHENTICATE.Signature
argument.¶
The server verifies the ClientProof
by computing the RecoveredStoredKey
and comparing it to the actual StoredKey
:¶
ClientSignature = HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage) RecoveredClientKey = ClientSignature XOR ReceivedClientProof RecoveredStoredKey = SHA256(RecoveredClientKey)¶
Note that the client MAY cache the ClientKey
and StoredKey
(or just SaltedPassword
) to avoid having to perform the expensive KDF computation for every authentication exchange. Storing these values securely on the client is outside the scope of this document.¶
ServerSignature¶
ServerSignature
is computed by the server during the authentication exchange as follows:¶
ServerSignature = HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)¶
The ServerSignature
is then sent to the client, base64-encoded, via the WELCOME.Details.authextra.verifier
attribute.¶
The client verifies the ServerSignature
by computing it and comparing it with the ServerSignature
sent by the server:¶
ServerKey = HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key") ServerSignature = HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)¶
Key Derivation Functions¶
SCRAM uses a password-based key derivation function (KDF) to hash user passwords. WAMP-SCRAM supports both Argon2 and PBKDF2 as the KDF. Argon2 is recommended because of its memory hardness and resistance against GPU hardware. PBKDF2, which does not feature memory hardness, is also supported for applications that are required to use primitives currently approved by cryptographic standards.¶
The following table maps the CHALLENGE.Details.kdf
type string to the corresponding KDF.¶
KDF type string | Function |
---|---|
"argon2id13"
|
Argon2id variant of Argon2, version 1.3 |
"pbkdf2"
|
PBKDF2 |
To promote interoperability, WAMP-SCRAM client/server implementations SHOULD support both of the above KDFs. During authentication, there is no "negotiation" of the KDF, and the client MUST use the same KDF than the one used to create the keys stored in the authentication database.¶
Which KDF is used to hash the password during user registration is up to the application and/or server implementation, and is not covered by this document. Possibilities include:¶
Argon2¶
The Argon2 key derivation function, proposed in draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2, is computed using the following parameters:¶
CHALLENGE.Details.salt
as the cryptographic salt,¶
CHALLENGE.Details.iterations
as the number of iterations,¶
CHALLENGE.Details.memory
as the memory size (in kibibytes),¶
For WAMP-SCRAM, the parallelism parameter is fixed to 1 due to the password being hashed on the client side, where it is not generally known how many cores/threads are available on the client's device.¶
Section 4 of the Argon2 internet draft recommends the general procedure for selecting parameters, of which the following guidelines are applicable to WAMP-SCRAM:¶
memory
parameter is to be configured to the maximum amount of memory usage that can be tolerated on client devices for computing the hash.¶
iterations
parameter is to be determined experimentally so that execution time on the client reaches the maximum that can be tolerated by users during authentication. If the execution time is intolerable with iterations
= 1, then reduce the memory
parameter as needed.¶
PBKDF2¶
The PBKDF2 key derivation function, defined in RFC2898, is used with SHA-256 as the pseudorandom function (PRF).¶
The PDBKDF2 hash is computed using the following parameters:¶
CHALLENGE.Details.salt
as the cryptographic salt,¶
CHALLENGE.Details.iterations
as the iteration count, and,¶
dkLen
), which matches the SHA-256 output length.¶
RFC2898 section 4.1 recommends at least 64 bits for the salt.¶
The iterations
parameter SHOULD be determined experimentally so that execution time on the client reaches the maximum that can be tolerated by users during authentication. RFC7677 section 4 recommends an iteration count of at least 4096, with a significantly higher value on non-mobile clients.¶
WAMP-Cryptosign is a WAMP authentication method based on public-private key cryptography. Specifically, it is based on Ed25519 digital signatures as described in [RFC8032].¶
Ed25519 is an elliptic curve signature scheme that instantiates the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) with elliptic curve parameters which are equivalent to Curve25519. Curve25519 is a SafeCurve, which means it is easy to implement and avoid security issues resulting from common implementation challenges and bugs. Ed25519 is intended to operate at around the 128-bit security level, and there are robust native implementations available as open-source, e.g. libsodium, which can be used from script languages, e.g. PyNaCl.¶
An implementation of WAMP-Cryptosign MUST provide¶
and MAY implement one or more of¶
The following sections describe each of above features of WAMP-Cryptosign.¶
Examples of complete authentication message exchanges can be found at the end of this chapter in Example Message Exchanges.¶
In WAMP, the following cryptographic primitives are used with WAMP-Cryptosign authentication:¶
Elliptic Curves:¶
SECG | Usage in WAMP |
---|---|
secp256r1 | Transport Encryption (WAMP transport encryption) |
curve25519 | Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign authentication) |
secp256k1 | Data Signatures (WAMP-Cryptosign certificates, WAMP E2E encryption) |
Hash Functions:¶
SECG | Usage in WAMP |
---|---|
sha256 | Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign authentication) |
keccak256 | Data Signatures (WAMP-Cryptosign certificates, WAMP E2E encryption) |
Note that sha256
refers to the SHA-2 algorithm, while sha3-256
is a different algorithm refering to SHA-3.¶
Signature Schemes:¶
SECG | Usage in WAMP |
---|---|
ed25519 | Session Authentication (WAMP-Cryptosign Authentication) |
ecdsa | Data Signatures (Ethereum, WAMP-Cryptosign Certificates, WAMP-E2E) |
A Client is authenticated to a Router by:¶
HELLO
, announcing its public key¶
CHALLENGE
with its private key¶
Thus, the client is identified using its public key, and the Router needs to know said public key and its desired realm and role in advance.¶
A Client for which the Router does not previously know the client's public key MAY use the Trustroots and Certificates feature to trust a Client based on an additional certificate presented by the client.¶
A Router is optionally (see Router Authentication) authenticated to a Client by:¶
HELLO.Details.challenge|string
¶
CHALLENGE.extra.signature|string
¶
Again, in this case, the Router includes a trustroot and certificate for the client to verify.¶
The challenge sent by the router is a 32 bytes random value, encoded as a Hex string in CHALLENGE.extra.challenge|string
.¶
When no channel binding is active, the Ed25519 signature over the 32 bytes message MUST be computed using the WAMP-Cryptosign private key of the authenticating client.¶
When channel binding is active, the challenge MUST first be XOR'ed bytewise with the channel ID, e.g. the 32 bytes from TLS with channel binding "tls-unique"
, and the resulting message (which again has length 32 bytes) MUST be signed using the WAMP-Cryptosign private key of the authenticating client.¶
The client MUST return the concatenation of the signature and the message signed (96 bytes) in the AUTHENTICATE
message.¶
A typical authentication begins with the client sending a HELLO
message specifying the cryptosign
method as (one of) the authentication methods:¶
[1, "realm1", { "roles": {/* see below */}, "authmethods": ["cryptosign"], "authid": "client01@example.com", "authextra": { "pubkey": "545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122" } }]¶
The HELLO.Details.authmethods|list
is used by the client to announce the authentication methods it is prepared to perform. For WAMP-Cryptosign, this MUST include "cryptosign"
.¶
The HELLO.Details.authid|string
is the authentication ID (e.g. username) the client wishes to authenticate as. For WAMP-Cryptosign authentication, this MAY be provided. If no authid
is provided, the router SHOULD automatically chose and assign an authid
(e.g. the Hex encode public key).¶
The HELLO.Details.authextra|dict
contains the following members for WAMP-Cryptosign:¶
Field | Type | Required | Description |
---|---|---|---|
pubkey | string | yes | The client public key (32 bytes) as a Hex encoded string, e.g. 545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122
|
channel_binding | string | no | If TLS channel binding is in use, the TLS channel binding type, e.g. "tls-unique" . |
challenge | string | no | A client chosen, random challenge (32 bytes) as a Hex encoded string, to be signed by the router. |
trustroot | string | no | When the client includes a client certificate (see below), the Ethereum address of the trustroot of the certificate chain to be used, e.g. 0x72b3486d38E9f49215b487CeAaDF27D6acf22115 , which can be a Standalone Trustroot or an On-chain Trustroot (see Trustroots) |
The client needs to announce the WAMP roles
and features it supports, for example:¶
{"callee": {"features": {"call_canceling": True, "caller_identification": True, "pattern_based_registration": True, "progressive_call_results": True, "registration_revocation": True, "shared_registration": True}}, "caller": {"features": {"call_canceling": True, "caller_identification": True, "progressive_call_results": True}}, "publisher": {"features": {"publisher_exclusion": True, "publisher_identification": True, "subscriber_blackwhite_listing": True}}, "subscriber": {"features": {"pattern_based_subscription": True, "publisher_identification": True, "subscription_revocation": True}}}}¶
If the router is unwilling or unable to perform WAMP-Cryptosign authentication, it'll either skip forward trying other authentication methods (if the client announced any) or send an ABORT
message.¶
If the router is willing to let the client authenticate using WAMP-Cryptosign and the router recognizes the provided HELLO.Details.authextra.pubkey|string
, it'll send a CHALLENGE
message:¶
[4, "cryptosign", { "challenge": "fa034062ad76352b53a25358854577730db82f367aa439709c91296d04a5716c", "channel_binding": null }]¶
The client will send an AUTHENTICATE
message containing a signature:¶
[5 'e2f0297a193b63b7a4a92028e9e2e6107f82730560d54a657bd982cb4b3151490399debbbde998e494d3c3b2a5e2e91271291e10dee85a6cfaa127885ddd8b0afa034062ad76352b53a25358854577730db82f367aa439709c91296d04a5716c', {}]¶
If the authentication succeeds, the server will router respond with a WELCOME
message:¶
[2, 7562122397119786, { "authextra": { "x_cb_node": "intel-nuci7-27532", "x_cb_peer": "tcp4:127.0.0.1:49032", "x_cb_pid": 27637, "x_cb_worker": "worker001" }, "authid": "client01@example.com", "authmethod": "cryptosign", "authprovider": "static", "authrole": "user", "realm": "realm1", "roles": {/* see below */} }]¶
where¶
authid|string
: The authentication ID the client was (actually) authenticated as.¶
authrole|string
: The authentication role the client was authenticated for.¶
authmethod|string
: The authentication method, here "cryptosign"
¶
authprovider|string
: The actual provider of authentication. For Ticket-based authentication, this can be freely chosen by the app, e.g. static
or dynamic
.¶
The WELCOME.Details
again contain the actual authentication information active. If the authentication fails, the router will response with an ABORT
message.¶
When the authentication is successful, WELCOME.Details.roles|dict
will announce the roles and features the router supports:¶
{"broker": {"features": {"event_retention": True, "pattern_based_subscription": True, "publisher_exclusion": True, "publisher_identification": True, "session_meta_api": True, "subscriber_blackwhite_listing": True, "subscription_meta_api": True, "subscription_revocation": True}}, "dealer": {"features": {"call_canceling": True, "caller_identification": True, "pattern_based_registration": True, "progressive_call_results": True, "registration_meta_api": True, "registration_revocation": True, "session_meta_api": True, "shared_registration": True, "testament_meta_api": True}} }¶
The following test vectors allow to verify an implementation of WAMP-Cryptosign signatures. You can use channel_id
, private_key
and challenge
as input, and check the computed signature matches signature
.¶
The test vectors contain instances for both with and without a channel_id
, which represents the TLS channel ID when using TLS with tls-unique
channel binding.¶
test_vectors_1 = [ { 'channel_id': None, 'private_key': '4d57d97a68f555696620a6d849c0ce582568518d729eb753dc7c732de2804510', 'challenge': 'ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff', 'signature': 'b32675b221f08593213737bef8240e7c15228b07028e19595294678c90d11c0cae80a357331bfc5cc9fb71081464e6e75013517c2cf067ad566a6b7b728e5d03ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff' }, { 'channel_id': None, 'private_key': 'd511fe78e23934b3dadb52fcd022974b80bd92bccc7c5cf404e46cc0a8a2f5cd', 'challenge': 'b26c1f87c13fc1da14997f1b5a71995dff8fbe0a62fae8473c7bdbd05bfb607d', 'signature': 'd4209ad10d5aff6bfbc009d7e924795de138a63515efc7afc6b01b7fe5201372190374886a70207b042294af5bd64ce725cd8dceb344e6d11c09d1aaaf4d660fb26c1f87c13fc1da14997f1b5a71995dff8fbe0a62fae8473c7bdbd05bfb607d' }, { 'channel_id': None, 'private_key': '6e1fde9cf9e2359a87420b65a87dc0c66136e66945196ba2475990d8a0c3a25b', 'challenge': 'b05e6b8ad4d69abf74aa3be3c0ee40ae07d66e1895b9ab09285a2f1192d562d2', 'signature': '7beb282184baadd08f166f16dd683b39cab53816ed81e6955def951cb2ddad1ec184e206746fd82bda075af03711d3d5658fc84a76196b0fa8d1ebc92ef9f30bb05e6b8ad4d69abf74aa3be3c0ee40ae07d66e1895b9ab09285a2f1192d562d2' }, { 'channel_id': '62e935ae755f3d48f80d4d59f6121358c435722a67e859cc0caa8b539027f2ff', 'private_key': '4d57d97a68f555696620a6d849c0ce582568518d729eb753dc7c732de2804510', 'challenge': 'ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff', 'signature': '9b6f41540c9b95b4b7b281c3042fa9c54cef43c842d62ea3fd6030fcb66e70b3e80d49d44c29d1635da9348d02ec93f3ed1ef227dfb59a07b580095c2b82f80f9d16ca518aa0c2b707f2b2a609edeca73bca8dd59817a633f35574ac6fd80d00' }, { 'channel_id': '62e935ae755f3d48f80d4d59f6121358c435722a67e859cc0caa8b539027f2ff', 'private_key': 'd511fe78e23934b3dadb52fcd022974b80bd92bccc7c5cf404e46cc0a8a2f5cd', 'challenge': 'b26c1f87c13fc1da14997f1b5a71995dff8fbe0a62fae8473c7bdbd05bfb607d', 'signature': '305aaa3ac25e98f651427688b3fc43fe7d8a68a7ec1d7d61c61517c519bd4a427c3015599d83ca28b4c652333920223844ef0725eb5dc2febfd6af7677b73f01d0852a29b460fc92ec943242ac638a053bbacc200512b18b30d15083cbdc9282' }, { 'channel_id': '62e935ae755f3d48f80d4d59f6121358c435722a67e859cc0caa8b539027f2ff', 'private_key': '6e1fde9cf9e2359a87420b65a87dc0c66136e66945196ba2475990d8a0c3a25b', 'challenge': 'b05e6b8ad4d69abf74aa3be3c0ee40ae07d66e1895b9ab09285a2f1192d562d2', 'signature': 'ee3c7644fd8070532bc1fde3d70d742267da545d8c8f03e63bda63f1ad4214f4d2c4bfdb4eb9526def42deeb7e31602a6ff99eba893e0a4ad4d45892ca75e608d2b75e24a189a7f78ca776ba36fc53f6c3e31c32f251f2c524f0a44202f2902d' }, ]¶
TLS Channel Binding is an optional feature for WAMP-Cryptosign when running on top of TLS for link encryption. The use of "channel binding" to bind authentication at application layers to secure sessions at lower layers in the network stack protects against certain attack scenarios. For more background information, please see¶
A client that wishes to use TLS Channel Binding with WAMP-Cryptosign must include an attribute channel_binding
in the authextra
sent in HELLO.Details
:¶
[1, 'realm1', { 'authextra': { 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122' }, 'authmethods': ['cryptosign'] }]¶
The channel_binding
, if present, MUST be a string with a value of tls-unique
or tls-exporter
,
to specify the channel binding type that is to be used:¶
tls-unique
: RFC5929: Channel Bindings for TLS¶
tls-exporter
: RFC9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3¶
When a router receives a HELLO message from a client with a TLS channel binding attribute present, the router MUST:¶
challenge XOR channel_id
¶
and send back the channel_binding
in use, and the challenge
in a CHALLENGE message:¶
[4, 'cryptosign', { 'challenge': '0e9192bc08512c8198da159c1ae600ba91729215f35d56102ee318558e773537', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique'}]¶
The authenticating client MUST verify the actual channel binding in use matches the one it requested. If a router does not support the channel_binding
the client requested, it may chose to continue the authentication without channel binding, and hence CHALLENGE.Extra
would not contain a channel_binding
.¶
The client MUST then locally fetch the channel_id
from the underlying TLS connection and
sign CHALLENGE.Extra.challenge XOR channel_id
using its private key.¶
With the basic Client Authentication mechanism in WAMP-Cryptosign, the router is able to authenticate
the client, since to successfully sign CHALLENGE.Extra.challenge
the client will need the
private key corresponding to the public key which the client announced in HELLO.Details.pubkey
to be authenticated under.¶
However, from this alone, the client can not be sure the router against which it is authenticating is actually valid, as in authentic. Router Authentication adds this capability.¶
To request a router to authenticate, a client will start the authentication handshake by sending
HELLO.Details.challenge|string
:¶
[1, 'realm1', { 'authextra': { 'challenge': 'bbae60ea44cdd7b20dc7010a618b0f0803fab25a817520b4b7f057299b524deb', 'pubkey': '545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122' }}]¶
Similar to Client Authentication, the challenge
must encode a 32 bytes random value as a string in HEX format, and the router MUST respond by signing this challenge value with its (the router's) private key,
and send back the signature in CHALLENGE.Extra.signature
¶
[4, 'cryptosign', { 'challenge': '0e9192bc08512c8198da159c1ae600ba91729215f35d56102ee318558e773537', 'pubkey': '4a3838f6fe75251e613329d53fc69b262d5eac97fb1d73bebbaed4015b53c862', 'signature': 'fd5128d2d207ba58a9d1d6f41b72c747964ad9d1294077b3b1eee6130b05843ab12c53c7f2519f73d4feb82db19d8ca0fc26b62bde6518e79a882f5795bc9f00bbae60ea44cdd7b20dc7010a618b0f0803fab25a817520b4b7f057299b524deb'}]¶
When Router Authentication is used, the router MUST also send its public key in CHALLENGE.Extra.pubkey
.¶
Further, Router Authentication can be combined with TLS Channel Binding, in which case the value
signed by the router will be HELLO.Details.challenge XOR channel_id
.¶
A public-key certificate is a signed statement that is used to establish an association between an identity and a public key. This is called a machine identity. The entity that vouches for this association and signs the certificate is the issuer of the certificate and the identity whose public key is being vouched for is the subject of the certificate. In order to associate the identity and the public key, a chain of certificates is used. The certificate chain is also called the certification path or chain of trust.¶
What is a Certificate Chain?¶
A certificate chain is a list of certificates (usually starting with an end-entity certificate) followed by one or more CA certificates (usually the last one being a self-signed certificate), with the following properties:¶
More information about certificate chains, while in the context of x509, can be found in this white paper published by the PKI forum: Understanding Certification Path Construction.¶
What are On-chain Trust Anchors?¶
In x509, the set of trusted root CA certificates are stored in a machine/device local certificate store. This set of trusted root CA certificates are:¶
With 1., the user implicitly trusts the vendor, and all root CAs in the set installed by the vendor. With 2., the user must manage a public-private key infrastructure, and when information is to be shared with other parties, the use PKI must be made available to those parties, and the parties will operationally and administratively depend on the PKI hosting party. In summary, x509 follows a centralized and hierarchical trust model.¶
With WAMP-Cryptosign, we use a public blockchain for certificate chain trust anchors. Using a public blockchain, specifically Ethereum, provides a decentralized, shared and cryptographically secure storage for root CA certificates, that is trust anchors. These anchors can be associated with other entities stored on-chain, such as federated Realms.¶
The following diagram shows the structure of certificate chains in WAMP-Cryptosign:¶
EIP712AuthorityCertificate +------------------------------+ | chainId | Root Certificate | verifyingContract | | validFrom | * trust anchor, stored on-chain +----+-- issuer (== realm owner) | * tied to a realm +----+-> subject (== issuer) -------+----+ * self-signed by realm owner | realm | | | capabilities | | | meta | | +------------------------------+ | +------------------------------+ | issuerSignature +----+---> Public Blockchain (L1 or L2) | +------------------------------+ | +------------------------------+ | | | | | EIP712AuthorityCertificate | +------------------------------+ | | chainId | | Intermediate Certificate | verifyingContract | | | validFrom | | * stored off-chain | issuer <------------------+----+ * same realm as issueing cert +-----+-- subject | * subset of capabilities | | realm | of issueing cert | | capabilities | | | meta | | +------------------------------+ | | issuerSignature | | +------------------------------+ | optional hierarchical chain of intermediate certificates | | EIP712AuthorityCertificate | +------------------------------+ | | chainId | Intermediate Certificate | | verifyingContract | | | validFrom | * stored off-chain +-----+-> issuer | * same realm as issueing cert | subject--------------------+----+ * subset of capabilities | realm | | of issueing cert | capabilities | | | meta | | +------------------------------+ | | issuerSignature | | +------------------------------+ | | | | | | EIP712DelegateCertificate | +------------------------------+ | | chainId | | End-point Certificate | verifyingContract | | | validFrom | | * ephemeral, generate per-boot | delegate <-----------------+----+ * subject is WAMP-Cryptosign pubkey | csPubKey | * Boot time (UTC in Posix ns) | bootedAt | | meta | | | | | +------------------------------+ +--------------------------+ | delegateSignature +---------> Hardware Security Module | +------------------------------+ +--------------------------+¶
The certificate types EIP712AuthorityCertificate
and EIP712DelegateCertificate
follow EIP712 and use Ethereum signatures.¶
EIP712AuthorityCertificate
:¶
[ { "name": "chainId", "type": "uint256" }, { "name": "verifyingContract", "type": "address" }, { "name": "validFrom", "type": "uint256" }, { "name": "issuer", "type": "address" }, { "name": "subject", "type": "address" }, { "name": "realm", "type": "address" }, { "name": "capabilities", "type": "uint64" }, { "name": "meta", "type": "string" } ]¶
EIP712DelegateCertificate
:¶
[ { "name": "chainId", "type": "uint256" }, { "name": "verifyingContract", "type": "address" }, { "name": "validFrom", "type": "uint256" }, { "name": "delegate", "type": "address" }, { "name": "csPubKey", "type": "bytes32" }, { "name": "bootedAt", "type": "uint64" }, { "name": "meta", "type": "string" } ]¶
The EIP712 types for certificates contain:¶
chainId
: the chain ID of the blockchain this signed typed data is bound to¶
verifyingContract
: the address of the (main) smart contract this signed typed data is bound to¶
This prevents cross-chain and cross-contract attacks. The chainId
is an integer according to EIP155:¶
Besides EIP712, other comparable approaches to specify cryptographically hashable, typed structured data ("messages") include:¶
CAPABILITY_ROOT_CA
¶
CAPABILITY_INTERMEDIATE_CA
¶
CAPABILITY_PUBLIC_RELAY
¶
CAPABILITY_PRIVATE_RELAY
¶
CAPABILITY_GATEWAY
¶
CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE
¶
CAPABILITY_PROVIDER
¶
CAPABILITY_CONSUMER
¶
0
¶
Permission to create a CAPABILITY_PUBLIC_RELAY
certificate on a realm can be
configured by the realm owner for:¶
PRIVATE
: signed by realm owner¶
PERMISSIONED
: signed by requestor and realm owner¶
OPEN
: signed by requestor¶
Permission for CAPABILITY_ROOT_CA
is always PRIVATE
.¶
use of a specific method/mechanism, when it comes to establishing trust (i.e. certifying public keys).¶
To verify a certificate chain and respective certificate signatures¶
[ (EIP712DelegateCertificate, Signature), // delegate certificate (EIP712AuthorityCertificate, Signature), // intermediate CA certificate ... (EIP712AuthorityCertificate, Signature), // intermediate CA certificate (EIP712AuthorityCertificate, Signature) // root CA certificate ]¶
the following Certificate Chain Rules (CCR) must be checked:¶
chainId
and verifyingContract
must match for all certificates to what we expect, and validFrom
before current block number on the respective chain.¶
realm
must match for all certificates to the respective realm.¶
EIP712DelegateCertificate
, and all subsequent certificates must be of type EIP712AuthorityCertificate
.¶
issuer
equals subject
), it is a root CA certificate.¶
issuer
must be equal to the subject
of the previous certificate.¶
validFrom
before the intermediate certificate¶
capabilities
of intermediate certificate must be a subset of the root cert¶
subject
must be the delegate certificate delegate
¶
validFrom
before the delegate certificate¶
issuer
.¶
issuer
.¶
delegate
.¶
Certificate chains allow to verify a delegate certificate following the Issuers-Subjects up to a Root CA, which is a self-signed certificate (issuer and subject are identical). The Root CA represents the Trustroot of all involved delegates.¶
When both a connecting WAMP client and the WAMP router are using the same Root CA and thus use a common Trustroot, they are said to be authorized in the same trust domain (identified by the trustroot).¶
Trustroots are identified by their Ethereum address, which is computed from the issuer public key according to EIP-55.¶
There are two types of Root CAs and Trustroots:¶
A Standalone Trustroot is managed by a single operator/owner, does not allow infrastructure elements (nodes, client, realms) to be integrated between different operators/owners and is privately stored on the respective operators systems only, usually as files or in databases.¶
Note that the Ethereum address, can be computed deterministically from the public key of the issuer of a certificate, even when the certificate (or the issuer) is not stored on-chain.¶
An On-chain Trustroot in contrast is stored in Ethereum and publically shared between different operators/owners which allows infrastructure elements (nodes, clients, realms) to be integrated. For example, clients/nodes operated by different operators can authenticate to each other and nodes operated by different operators can authenticate to each other sharing the hosting of one realm.¶
The management of On-Chain Trustroots depends on the policy of the trustroot which is chosen and fixed when the trustroot is created:¶
With an Open On-chain Trustroot, new certificates can be added to a certificate chain freely and only requires a signature by the respective intermediate CA issuer.¶
For a Standalone Trustroot the trustroot
MUST be specified in HELLO.Details.authextra.trustroot|string
¶
{'authextra': {'certificates': [/* certificate, see below */], 'challenge': '2763e7fdb1c34a74e8497daf6c913744d11161a94cec3b16aeec60a788612e17', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '12ae0184b180e9a9c5e45be4a1afbce3c6491320063701cd9c4011a777d04089', 'trustroot': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'},¶
and certificates
MUST contain¶
EIP712DelegateCertificate
, and have the complete certificate chain of EIP712AuthorityCertificate
s up to trustroot
pre-agreed (locally stored or built-in) OR¶
EIP712DelegateCertificate
followed by one or more EIP712AuthorityCertificate
s up to trustroot
.¶
Example 3 contains an example gor the latter, with a bundled complete certificate chain, that is the last certificate in the list is self-signed (is a root CA certificate) and matches trustroot
¶
trustroot == 0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57 == certificates[-1].issuer == certificates[-1].subject¶
For an On-chain Trustroot the trustroot
MUST be specified in HELLO.Details.authextra.trustroot|string
¶
{'authextra': {'certificates': [/* certificate, see below */], 'challenge': '2763e7fdb1c34a74e8497daf6c913744d11161a94cec3b16aeec60a788612e17', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '12ae0184b180e9a9c5e45be4a1afbce3c6491320063701cd9c4011a777d04089', 'trustroot': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'},¶
and certificates
MUST contain a single EIP712DelegateCertificate
, and have the complete certificate chain of EIP712AuthorityCertificate
s up to trustroot
stored on-chain (Ethereum).¶
This is called a free-standing, on-chain CA.¶
When the trustroot
is associated with an on-chain Realm that has trustroot
configured as the
Realm CA, this is called On-chain CA with CA associated with On-chain Realm.¶
Remote attestation is a method by which a host (WAMP client) authenticates its hardware and software configuration to a remote host (WAMP router). The goal of remote attestation is to enable a remote system (challenger) to determine the level of trust in the integrity of the platform of another system (attestator).¶
Remote attestation allows to¶
Remote attestation is requested by the router sending CHALLENGE.extra.attest|list[int]
with a list of device PCRs to be quoted.
A list of all PCRs available (usually 24) in a PCR bank of a device can be obtained running tpm2_pcrread without arguments.¶
A client receiving such a CHALLENGE
MUST include an Event Log with PCRs collected from measured boot signed by the device's security module's Attestation Key (AK) and using the challenge sent by the router CHALLENGE.extra.challenge|string
as a nonce.
TPM 2.0 of the TCG specifies a suitable function in tss2_quote (also see here).¶
The client MUST include the signed attestation in AUTHENTICATE.Extra.quote
and the corresponding measurement log in AUTHENTICATE.Extra.measurement
.
The following diagram illustrates Remote Attestation with WAMP-Cryptosign:¶
+------------------------------+ | CHALLENGE sent by router | +------------------------------+ Selected PCRs (bitmap) == CHALLENGE.Extra.attest Nonce == CHALLENGE.Extra.challenge | | | | Quote (signed with AK) | +------------------------------+ | | | +----> | Selected PCRs (bitmap) | | | | | | PCR values (digest) | | | | +----> | Nonce | | | +------------------------------+ | Signature (Attestation Key) | | | +------------------------------+ + +------------------------------+ | | | Measurement Log | | | | | | | +------------------------------+ | | | | | | +------------------------------+ +--> | AUTHENTICATE sent by client | +------------------------------+ AUTHENTICATE.Extra.quote AUTHENTICATE.Extra.measurement¶
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> HELLO:: [1, 'devices', {'authextra': {'challenge': 'bbae60ea44cdd7b20dc7010a618b0f0803fab25a817520b4b7f057299b524deb', 'channel_binding': None, 'pubkey': '545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122'}, 'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'shared_registration': True}}, 'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'progressive_call_results': True}}, 'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}}, 'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}}}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << CHALLENGE:: [4, 'cryptosign', {'challenge': '0e9192bc08512c8198da159c1ae600ba91729215f35d56102ee318558e773537', 'channel_binding': None, 'pubkey': '4a3838f6fe75251e613329d53fc69b262d5eac97fb1d73bebbaed4015b53c862', 'signature': 'fd5128d2d207ba58a9d1d6f41b72c747964ad9d1294077b3b1eee6130b05843ab12c53c7f2519f73d4feb82db19d8ca0fc26b62bde6518e79a882f5795bc9f00bbae60ea44cdd7b20dc7010a618b0f0803fab25a817520b4b7f057299b524deb'}] << WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> AUTHENTICATE:: [5, 'a3a178fe792ed772a8fc092f8341e455de96670c8901264a7c312dbf940d5743626fe9fbc29b23dcd2169b308eca309de85a89ccd296b24835de3d95b16b77030e9192bc08512c8198da159c1ae600ba91729215f35d56102ee318558e773537', {}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << WELCOME:: [2, 3735119691078036, {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-49879', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:53976', 'x_cb_pid': 49987, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}, 'authid': 'client01@example.com', 'authmethod': 'cryptosign', 'authprovider': 'static', 'authrole': 'device', 'realm': 'devices', 'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True, 'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True, 'subscription_meta_api': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}, 'dealer': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_meta_api': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'shared_registration': True, 'testament_meta_api': True}}}, 'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-49879', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:53976', 'x_cb_pid': 49987, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}] << WAMP-Transmit(3735119691078036, client01@example.com) >> GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] >> WAMP-Receive(3735119691078036, client01@example.com) << GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] <<¶
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> HELLO:: [1, 'devices', {'authextra': {'challenge': '4f861f12796c2972b7b0026522a687aa851d90355122a61d4f1fdce4d06b564f', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '545efb0a2192db8d43f118e9bf9aee081466e1ef36c708b96ee6f62dddad9122'}, 'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'shared_registration': True}}, 'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'progressive_call_results': True}}, 'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}}, 'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}}}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << CHALLENGE:: [4, 'cryptosign', {'challenge': '358625312c6c3bf64ed51d17d210ce21af1639c774cabf5735a9651d7d91fc6a', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '4a3838f6fe75251e613329d53fc69b262d5eac97fb1d73bebbaed4015b53c862', 'signature': 'aa05f4cd7747d36b79443f1d4703a681e107edc085d876b508714e2a3a8135bacaae1c018452c4acb3ad2818aa97a6d23e5ac7e3734c7b1f40e6232a70938205a6f5a1f034a28090b195fb2ce2454a82532f5c8baf6ba1dfb5ddae63c09ce72f'}] << WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> AUTHENTICATE:: [5, '25114474580d6e99a6126b091b4565c23db567d686c5b8c3a94e3f2f09dc80300c5b40a124236733fa56396df721eb12ac092362379bd5b27b4db9e2beaa1408dcf59bd361a2921448f0e45e12f303097924f5798a83b895cf6b179a6d664d0a', {}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << WELCOME:: [2, 7325966140445461, {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-49879', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:54046', 'x_cb_pid': 49987, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}, 'authid': 'client01@example.com', 'authmethod': 'cryptosign', 'authprovider': 'static', 'authrole': 'device', 'realm': 'devices', 'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True, 'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True, 'subscription_meta_api': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}, 'dealer': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_meta_api': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'shared_registration': True, 'testament_meta_api': True}}}, 'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-49879', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:54046', 'x_cb_pid': 49987, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}] << 2022-07-13T17:38:29+0200 session joined: {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-49879', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:54046', 'x_cb_pid': 49987, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}, 'authid': 'client01@example.com', 'authmethod': 'cryptosign', 'authprovider': 'static', 'authrole': 'device', 'realm': 'devices', 'resumable': False, 'resume_token': None, 'resumed': False, 'serializer': 'cbor.batched', 'session': 7325966140445461, 'transport': {'channel_framing': 'websocket', 'channel_id': {'tls-unique': b'\xe9s\xbe\xe2M\xce\xa9\xe2' b'\x06%\xf9I\xc0\xe3\xcd(' b'\xd62\xcc\xbe\xfeI\x07\xc2' b'\xfa\xc2r\x87\x10\xf7\xb1`'}, 'channel_serializer': None, 'channel_type': 'tls', 'http_cbtid': None, 'http_headers_received': None, 'http_headers_sent': None, 'is_secure': True, 'is_server': False, 'own': None, 'own_fd': -1, 'own_pid': 50690, 'own_tid': 50690, 'peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:8080', 'peer_cert': None, 'websocket_extensions_in_use': None, 'websocket_protocol': None}} WAMP-Transmit(7325966140445461, client01@example.com) >> GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] >> WAMP-Receive(7325966140445461, client01@example.com) << GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] <<¶
WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> HELLO:: [1, 'devices', {'authextra': {'certificates': [({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': '1'}, 'message': {'bootedAt': 1658765756680628959, 'chainId': 1, 'csPubKey': '12ae0184b180e9a9c5e45be4a1afbce3c6491320063701cd9c4011a777d04089', 'delegate': '0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6', 'meta': '', 'validFrom': 15212703, 'verifyingContract': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'}, 'primaryType': 'EIP712DelegateCertificate', 'types': {'EIP712DelegateCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'verifyingContract', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'validFrom', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'delegate', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'csPubKey', 'type': 'bytes32'}, {'name': 'bootedAt', 'type': 'uint64'}, {'name': 'meta', 'type': 'string'}], 'EIP712Domain': [{'name': 'name', 'type': 'string'}, {'name': 'version', 'type': 'string'}]}}, '8fe06bb269110c6bc0e011ea2b7da07091c674f7fe67458c1805157157da702b70b56cdf662666dc386820ded0116b6b84151df1ed65210eeecd7e477cdb765b1b'), ({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': '1'}, 'message': {'capabilities': 12, 'chainId': 1, 'issuer': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57', 'meta': '', 'realm': '0xA6e693CC4A2b4F1400391a728D26369D9b82ef96', 'subject': '0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6', 'validFrom': 15212703, 'verifyingContract': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'}, 'primaryType': 'EIP712AuthorityCertificate', 'types': {'EIP712AuthorityCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'verifyingContract', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'validFrom', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'issuer', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'subject', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'realm', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'capabilities', 'type': 'uint64'}, {'name': 'meta', 'type': 'string'}], 'EIP712Domain': [{'name': 'name', 'type': 'string'}, {'name': 'version', 'type': 'string'}]}}, '0c0eb60a108dbd72a204b41c1d18505358e4e7886b0c9787192a33ac9e0f94c92ce158f8de576fa9cccf28a8c9404ed66c2d355ea4ae7ee65cff0b73215b91bb1c'), ({'domain': {'name': 'WMP', 'version': '1'}, 'message': {'capabilities': 63, 'chainId': 1, 'issuer': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57', 'meta': '', 'realm': '0xA6e693CC4A2b4F1400391a728D26369D9b82ef96', 'subject': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57', 'validFrom': 15212703, 'verifyingContract': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'}, 'primaryType': 'EIP712AuthorityCertificate', 'types': {'EIP712AuthorityCertificate': [{'name': 'chainId', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'verifyingContract', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'validFrom', 'type': 'uint256'}, {'name': 'issuer', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'subject', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'realm', 'type': 'address'}, {'name': 'capabilities', 'type': 'uint64'}, {'name': 'meta', 'type': 'string'}], 'EIP712Domain': [{'name': 'name', 'type': 'string'}, {'name': 'version', 'type': 'string'}]}}, 'be35c8d6ae735d3bd8b5e27b1e1a067eba53e6a1cb4ef0f607c4717435e8ffa676246e7d08dfb4e83c78ad26f423b727b5d2c90627bdf6c94c1dbdf01979c34b1c')], 'challenge': '2763e7fdb1c34a74e8497daf6c913744d11161a94cec3b16aeec60a788612e17', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '12ae0184b180e9a9c5e45be4a1afbce3c6491320063701cd9c4011a777d04089', 'trustroot': '0xf766Dc789CF04CD18aE75af2c5fAf2DA6650Ff57'}, 'authmethods': ['cryptosign'], 'roles': {'callee': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'shared_registration': True}}, 'caller': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'progressive_call_results': True}}, 'publisher': {'features': {'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True}}, 'subscriber': {'features': {'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}}}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << CHALLENGE:: [4, 'cryptosign', {'challenge': 'e4b40f72f9604754789d472225483bace926b9668d72c9122545e540d8d98f23', 'channel_binding': 'tls-unique', 'pubkey': '4a3838f6fe75251e613329d53fc69b262d5eac97fb1d73bebbaed4015b53c862', 'signature': 'ce456092998d796533d7ef2bab543300409d161066c9520c9284df6bbfb82947b37fb78d69fd56e5118afec62e35e015c60569af2e18ed92fedc738552242d039a38790e9c94064d89335393d39973c14074cd1008d7266de74c641103e30609'}] << WAMP-Transmit(-, -) >> AUTHENTICATE:: [5, '16c89629e72aff3f44661e701341b2221a2fa9d93205826fad85e70d3a8dab70a8f54314c14d470ebeb77a0dd16c833928c01134a52b2e73862b7d3f258b600059ef9181d4370b6d19e7691e9a407f29784315dfc949d4696ce5e1f6535ba73d', {}] >> WAMP-Receive(-, -) << WELCOME:: [2, 869996509191260, {'authextra': {'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-30969', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:59172', 'x_cb_pid': 31090, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}, 'authid': '0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6', 'authmethod': 'cryptosign', 'authprovider': 'static', 'authrole': 'user', 'realm': 'realm1', 'roles': {'broker': {'features': {'event_retention': True, 'pattern_based_subscription': True, 'publisher_exclusion': True, 'publisher_identification': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'subscriber_blackwhite_listing': True, 'subscription_meta_api': True, 'subscription_revocation': True}}, 'dealer': {'features': {'call_canceling': True, 'caller_identification': True, 'pattern_based_registration': True, 'progressive_call_results': True, 'registration_meta_api': True, 'registration_revocation': True, 'session_meta_api': True, 'shared_registration': True, 'testament_meta_api': True}}}, 'x_cb_node': 'intel-nuci7-30969', 'x_cb_peer': 'tcp4:127.0.0.1:59172', 'x_cb_pid': 31090, 'x_cb_worker': 'worker001'}] << WAMP-Transmit(869996509191260, 0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6) >> GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] >> WAMP-Receive(869996509191260, 0xf5173a6111B2A6B3C20fceD53B2A8405EC142bF6) << GOODBYE:: [6, {}, 'wamp.close.normal'] <<¶
Write me.¶
This section covers some advanced features and techniques provided by WAMP mainly but not limited to security and cryptography.¶
In some situations, you may want to reduce the access the router has to the information users transmit, or payload data is presented in some specific format that can not be simply recognized by WAMP router serializer.¶
Here are some use cases:¶
The above use cases can be fulfilled with the Payload Passthru Mode
feature. This feature allows:¶
CALL
, PUBLISH
, EVENT
, YIELD
, RESULT
messages
to signal the Router to skip payload inspection/conversion.¶
INVOCATION
and ERROR
messages¶
Feature Announcement¶
Support for this advanced feature MUST be announced by Callers (role := "caller"
), Callees (role := "callee"
),
Dealers (role := "dealer"
), Publishers (role := "publisher"
), Subscribers (role := "subscriber"
)
and Brokers (role := "broker"
) via¶
HELLO.Details.roles.<role>.features.payload_passthru_mode|bool := true¶
Payload Passthru Mode can work only if all three nodes (Caller, Dealer, Callee or Publisher, Broker, Subscriber) support and announced this feature.¶
Cases where a Caller sends a CALL
message with payload passthru
without announcing it during the HELLO
handshake MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with
the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Caller sends a CALL
message with payload passthru
to a Dealer, the latter not announcing
payload passthru
support during WELCOME
handshake MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and the underlying WAMP
connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Caller sends a CALL
message with payload passthru
to a Dealer that supports this feature,
which then must be routed to a Callee which doesn't support payload passthru
, MUST be treated as
APPLICATION ERRORS and the Dealer MUST respond to the Caller with a wamp.error.feature_not_supported
error message.¶
Cases where a Publisher sends a PUBLISH
message with payload passthru
, without announcing it during HELLO
handshake, MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with
the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Publisher sends a PUBLISH
message with payload passthru
to a Broker, with the latter not
announcing payload passthru
support during the WELCOME
handshake, MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and
the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Publisher sends a PUBLISH
message with payload passthru
to a Broker that supports this feature,
which then must be routed to a Subscriber which doesn't support payload passthru
, cannot be recognized at the
protocol level due to asynchronous message processing and must be covered at the Subscriber side.¶
Cases where a Callee sends a YIELD
message with payload passthru
without announcing it during the HELLO
handshake MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and the underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with
the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Callee sends a YIELD
message with payload passthru
to a Dealer, with the latter not announcing
payload passthru
support during the WELCOME
handshake, MUST be treated as PROTOCOL ERRORS and the
underlying WAMP connections must be aborted with the wamp.error.protocol_violation
error reason.¶
Cases where a Callee sends a YIELD
message with payload passthru
to a Dealer that supports this feature,
which then must be routed to the Caller which doesn't support payload passthru
, MUST be treated as
APPLICATION ERRORS and the Dealer MUST respond to the Callee with a wamp.error.feature_not_supported
error message.¶
Message Attributes¶
To use payload passthru mode, the options for CALL
, PUBLISH
and YIELD
messages MUST be extended with additional
attributes. These additional attributes must be forwarded via INVOCATION
, EVENT
and RESULT
messages, respectively,
as well as ERROR
messages in the case of failures.¶
CALL.Options.ppt_scheme|string CALL.Options.ppt_serializer|string CALL.Options.ppt_cipher|string CALL.Options.ppt_keyid|string --- INVOCATION.Details.ppt_scheme|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_serializer|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_cipher|string INVOCATION.Details.ppt_keyid|string --- YIELD.Options.ppt_scheme|string YIELD.Options.ppt_serializer|string YIELD.Options.ppt_cipher|string YIELD.Options.ppt_keyid|string --- RESULT.Details.ppt_scheme|string RESULT.Details.ppt_serializer|string RESULT.Details.ppt_cipher|string RESULT.Details.ppt_keyid|string --- ERROR.Details.ppt_scheme|string ERROR.Details.ppt_serializer|string ERROR.Details.ppt_cipher|string ERROR.Details.ppt_keyid|string¶
PUBLISH.Options.ppt_scheme|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_serializer|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_cipher|string PUBLISH.Options.ppt_keyid|string --- EVENT.Details.ppt_scheme|string EVENT.Details.ppt_serializer|string EVENT.Details.ppt_cipher|string EVENT.Details.ppt_keyid|string --- ERROR.Options.ppt_scheme|string ERROR.Options.ppt_serializer|string ERROR.Options.ppt_cipher|string ERROR.Options.ppt_keyid|string¶
ppt_scheme Attribute¶
The ppt_scheme
identifies the Payload Schema. It is a required string attribute. For End-2-End Encryption flow
this attribute can contain the name or identifier of a key management provider that is known to the target peer,
so it can be used with help of additional ppt_*
attributes to obtain information about encryption keys.
For gateways and external schemas this can contain the name of related technology. The one predefined is mqtt
.
Others may be introduced later. A Router can recognize that Payload Passthru Mode
is in use by checking
the existence and non-empty value of this attribute within the options of CALL
, PUBLISH
and YIELD
messages.¶
ppt_serializer Attribute¶
The ppt_serializer
attribute is optional. It specifies what serializer was used to encode the payload.
It can be a native
value to indicate that the incoming data is tunneling through other technologies
specified by the ppt_scheme
, or it can be ordinary json
, msgpack
, cbor
, flatbuffers
data serializers.
For some predefined ppt_scheme
schemas this option may be omitted as schema defines the concrete serializer.
See predefined schemas below.¶
ppt_cipher Attribute¶
The ppt_cipher
attribute is optional. It is required if the payload is encrypted. This attribute specifies the
cryptographic algorithm that was used to encrypt the payload. It can be xsalsa20poly1305
, aes256gcm
for now.¶
ppt_keyid Attribute¶
The ppt_keyid
attribute is optional. This attribute can contain the encryption key id that was used to encrypt
the payload. The ppt_keyid
attribute is a string type. The value can be a hex-encoded string, URI, DNS name,
Ethereum address, UUID identifier - any meaningful value which allows the target peer to choose a private key
without guessing. The format of the value may depend on the ppt_scheme
attribute.¶
ppt_ Predefined Schemes¶
MQTT Predefined Scheme¶
Attribute | Required? | Value |
---|---|---|
ppt_scheme | Y | mqtt |
ppt_serializer | N* | native, json, msgpack, cbor |
ppt_cipher | N | - |
ppt_keyid | N | - |
*: If ppt_serializer
is not provided then it is assuming as native
. So no additional serialization
will be applied to payload and payload will be serialized within WAMP message with session serializer.¶
End-to-End Encryption Predefined Scheme¶
For End-to-End Encryption
flow both peers must support chosen ppt_serializer
regardless of their own
session serializer.¶
Attribute | Required? | Value |
---|---|---|
ppt_scheme | Y | wamp |
ppt_serializer | Y | cbor, flatbuffers |
ppt_cipher | N | xsalsa20poly1305, aes256gcm |
ppt_keyid | N | * |
*: The least significant 20 bytes (160 bits) of the SHA256 of the public key (32 bytes) of the data encryption key,
as a hex-encoded string with prefix 0x
and either uppercase/lowercase alphabetic characters, encoding a
checksum according to EIP55.¶
Custom Scheme Example¶
Attribute | Required? | Value |
---|---|---|
ppt_scheme | Y | x_my_ppt |
ppt_serializer | N | custom |
ppt_cipher | N | custom |
ppt_keyid | N | custom |
When Payload Passthru Mode
is used for gateways to other technologies, such as MQTT Brokers, then
the ppt_serializer
attribute may be set to the native
value. This means that the payload is not to be modified
by WAMP peers, nor serialized in any manner, and is delivered as-is from the originating peer. Another possible case
is when the ppt_serializer
attribute is set to any valid serializer, for example msgpack
. In this case the
originating WAMP client peer first applies ppt_serializer
to serialize the payload (without encryption), then
the resulting binary payload is embedded in the WAMP message, the latter having possibly a different serializer
depending on the one chosen during WAMP Session establishment.¶
Important Note Regarding JSON Serialization¶
With Payload Passthru Mode
, payloads are treated as binary. To send these binary payloads, the WAMP session
serializer MUST support byte arrays. Most serialization formats known to WAMP support byte arrays, but JSON does
not support them natively. To use Payload Passthru Mode
with a JSON serializer, WAMP peers MUST perform the special
Binary serialization in JSON. This conversion may have unacceptable overhead, so it is
generally advised to use WAMP session serializers with native byte array support, for example,
MessagePack
, CBOR
, or FlatBuffers
.¶
Message Structure¶
When Payload Passthru Mode
is in use, the message payload MUST be sent as one binary item within
Arguments|list
, while ArgumentsKw|dict
MUST be absent or empty.¶
Since many WAMP messages assume the possibility of simultaneous use of Arguments|list
and ArgumentsKw|dict
,
WAMP client implementations must package arguments into the following hash table and then serialize it and
transmit as a single element within Arguments|list
.¶
{ "args": Arguments|list, "kwargs": ArgumentsKw|dict }¶
This will allow maintaining a single interface for client applications, regardless of whether the
Payload Passthru Mode
mode, or especially Payload End-to-End Encryption
which is built on top of
Payload End-to-End Encryption
is used or not.¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL
with encryption and key ID¶
[ 48, 25471, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "cbor", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evIWpKGQAPdOh0=" }, "com.myapp.secret_rpc_for_sensitive_data", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer progressive CALL
with encryption and key ID.¶
Note that nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode
with other features such as,
for example, Progressive Call Results
or Progressive Call Invocations
.¶
[ 48, 25471, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evIWpKGQAPdOh0=", "progress": true }, "com.myapp.progressive_rpc_for_sensitive_data", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL
with MQTT payload. Specifying "ppt_serializer": "native"
means that
the original MQTT message payload is passed as WAMP payload message as is, without any transcoding.¶
[ 48, 25471, { "ppt_scheme": "mqtt", "ppt_serializer": "native" }, "com.myapp.mqtt_processing", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Caller-to-Dealer CALL
with MQTT payload. Specifying "ppt_scheme": "mqtt"
simply indicates that
the original source of payload data is received from a related system. Specifying "ppt_serializer": "json"
means that the original MQTT message payload was parsed and encoded with the json
serializer before
embedding it into WAMP message.¶
[ 48, 25471, { "ppt_scheme": "mqtt", "ppt_serializer": "json" }, "com.myapp.mqtt_processing", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION
with encryption and key ID¶
[ 68, 35477, 1147, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "cbor", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evIWpKGQAPdOh0=" }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Callee INVOCATION
with MQTT payload¶
[ 68, 35479, 3344, { "ppt_scheme": "mqtt", "ppt_serializer": "native" }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer YIELD
with encryption and key ID¶
[ 70, 87683, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=" }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer progressive YIELD
with encryption and key ID¶
Nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode
with other features such as, for example, Progressive Call Results
.¶
[ 70, 87683, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=", "progress": true }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller RESULT
with encryption and key ID¶
[ 50, 77133, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=" }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Dealer-to-Caller progressive RESULT
with encryption and key ID¶
Nothing prevents the use of Payload Passthru Mode
with other features such as, for example, Progressive Call Results
.¶
[ 50, 77133, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=", "progress": true }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Callee-to-Dealer ERROR
with encryption and key ID¶
[ 8, 68, 87683, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "cbor", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=" }, "com.myapp.invalid_revenue_year", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Publishing event to a topic with encryption and key ID¶
[ 16, 45677, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "cbor", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=" }, "com.myapp.mytopic1", [Payload|binary] ]¶
Example. Receiving event for a topic with encryption and key ID¶
[ 36, 5512315355, 4429313566, { "ppt_scheme": "wamp", "ppt_serializer": "flatbuffers", "ppt_cipher": "xsalsa20poly1305", "ppt_keyid": "GTtQ37XGJO2O4R8Dvx4AUo8pe61D9evNSpGMDQWdOh1=" }, [Payload|binary] ]¶
About Supported Serializers and Cryptographic Ciphers¶
WAMP serves as infrastructure for delivering messages between peers. Regardless of what encryption algorithm
and serializer were chosen for Payload Passthru Mode
, a Router shall not inspect and analyze the ppt_
options
and payload of encrypted messages. The application is responsible for choosing serializers and
ciphers known to every peer involved in message processing.¶
The only requirements that WAMP expects from a transport are: the transport must be message-based, bidirectional, reliable and ordered. This allows WAMP to run over different transports without any impact at the application layer.¶
Besides the WebSocket transport, the following WAMP transports are currently specified:¶
Other transports such as HTTP 2.0 ("SPDY") or UDP might be defined in the future.¶
WAMP-over-RawSocket is an (alternative) transport for WAMP that uses length-prefixed, binary messages - a message framing different from WebSocket.¶
Compared to WAMP-over-WebSocket, WAMP-over-RawSocket is simple to implement, since there is no need to implement the WebSocket protocol which has some features that make it non-trivial (like a full HTTP-based opening handshake, message fragmentation, masking and variable length integers).¶
WAMP-over-RawSocket has even lower overhead than WebSocket, which can be desirable in particular when running on local connections like loopback TCP or Unix domain sockets. It is also expected to allow implementations in microcontrollers in under 2KB RAM.¶
WAMP-over-RawSocket can run over TCP, TLS, Unix domain sockets or any reliable streaming underlying transport. When run over TLS on the standard port for secure HTTPS (443), it is also able to traverse most locked down networking environments such as enterprise or mobile networks (unless man-in-the-middle TLS intercepting proxies are in use).¶
However, WAMP-over-RawSocket cannot be used with Web browser clients, since browsers do not allow raw TCP connections. Browser extensions would do, but those need to be installed in a browser. WAMP-over-RawSocket also (currently) does not support transport-level compression as WebSocket does provide (permessage-deflate
WebSocket extension).¶
Endianess¶
WAMP-over-RawSocket uses network byte order ("big-endian"). That means, given a unsigned 32 bit integer¶
0x 11 22 33 44¶
the first octet sent out to (or received from) the wire is 0x11
and the last octet sent out (or received) is 0x44
.¶
Here is how you would convert octets received from the wire into an integer in Python:¶
import struct octets_received = b"\x11\x22\x33\x44" i = struct.unpack(">L", octets_received)[0]¶
The integer received has the value 287454020
.¶
And here is how you would send out an integer to the wire in Python:¶
octets_to_be_send = struct.pack(">L", i)¶
The octets to be sent are b"\x11\x22\x33\x44"
.¶
Handshake: Client-to-Router Request¶
WAMP-over-RawSocket starts with a handshake where the client connecting to a router sends 4 octets:¶
MSB LSB 31 0 0111 1111 LLLL SSSS RRRR RRRR RRRR RRRR¶
The first octet is a magic octet with value 0x7F
. This value is chosen to avoid any possible collision with the first octet of a valid HTTP request (see here and here). No valid HTTP request can have 0x7F
as its first octet.¶
By using a magic first octet that cannot appear in a regular HTTP request, WAMP-over-RawSocket can be run e.g. on the same TCP listening port as WAMP-over-WebSocket or WAMP-over-LongPoll.¶
The second octet consists of a 4 bit LENGTH
field and a 4 bit SERIALIZER
field.¶
The LENGTH
value is used by the Client to signal the maximum message length of messages it is willing to receive. When the handshake completes successfully, a Router MUST NOT send messages larger than this size.¶
The possible values for LENGTH
are:¶
0: 2**9 octets 1: 2**10 octets ... 14: 2**23 octets 15: 2**24 octets¶
This means a Client can choose the maximum message length between 512 and 16M octets.¶
The SERIALIZER
value is used by the Client to request a specific serializer to be used. When the handshake completes successfully, the Client and Router will use the serializer requested by the Client.¶
The possible values for SERIALIZER
are:¶
0: illegal 1: JSON 2: MessagePack 3: CBOR 4: UBJSON 5: FlatBuffers 6 - 15: reserved for future serializers¶
Here is a Python program that prints all (currently) permissible values for the second octet:¶
SERMAP = { 1: 'json', 2: 'msgpack', 3: 'cbor', 4: 'ubjson', 5: 'flatbuffers', } # map serializer / max. msg length to RawSocket handshake # request or success reply (2nd octet) for ser in SERMAP: for l in range(16): octet_2 = (l << 4) | ser print("serializer: {}, maxlen: {} => 0x{:02x}".format(SERMAP[ser], 2 ** (l + 9), octet_2))¶
The third and forth octet are reserved and MUST be all zeros for now.¶
Handshake: Router-to-Client Reply¶
After a Client has connected to a Router, the Router will first receive the 4 octets handshake request from the Client.¶
If the first octet differs from 0x7F
, it is not a WAMP-over-RawSocket request. Unless the Router also supports other transports on the connecting port (such as WebSocket or LongPoll), the Router MUST fail the connection.¶
Here is an example of how a Router could parse the second octet in a Clients handshake request:¶
# map RawSocket handshake request (2nd octet) to # serializer / max. msg length for i in range(256): ser_id = i & 0x0f if ser_id != 0: ser = SERMAP.get(ser_id, 'currently undefined') maxlen = 2 ** ((i >> 4) + 9) print("{:02x} => serializer: {}, maxlen: {}".format(i, ser, maxlen)) else: print("fail the connection: illegal serializer value")¶
When the Router is willing to speak the serializer requested by the Client, it will answer with a 4 octets response of identical structure as the Client request:¶
MSB LSB 31 0 0111 1111 LLLL SSSS RRRR RRRR RRRR RRRR¶
Again, the first octet MUST be the value 0x7F
. The third and forth octets are reserved and MUST be all zeros for now.¶
In the second octet, the Router MUST echo the serializer value in SERIALIZER
as requested by the Client.¶
Similar to the Client, the Router sets the LENGTH
field to request a limit on the length of messages sent by the Client.¶
During the connection, Router MUST NOT send messages to the Client longer than the LENGTH
requested by the Client, and the Client MUST NOT send messages larger than the maximum requested by the Router in its handshake reply.¶
If a message received during a connection exceeds the limit requested, a Peer MUST fail the connection.¶
When the Router is unable to speak the serializer requested by the Client, or it is denying the Client for other reasons, the Router replies with an error:¶
MSB LSB 31 0 0111 1111 EEEE 0000 RRRR RRRR RRRR RRRR¶
An error reply has 4 octets: the first octet is again the magic 0x7F
, and the third and forth octet are reserved and MUST all be zeros for now.¶
The second octet has its lower 4 bits zero'ed (which distinguishes the reply from an success/accepting reply) and the upper 4 bits encode the error:¶
0: illegal (must not be used) 1: serializer unsupported 2: maximum message length unacceptable 3: use of reserved bits (unsupported feature) 4: maximum connection count reached 5 - 15: reserved for future errors¶
Note that the error code
0
MUST NOT be used. This is to allow storage of error state in a host language variable, while allowing0
to signal the current state "no error"¶
Here is an example of how a Router might create the second octet in an error response:¶
ERRMAP = { 0: "illegal (must not be used)", 1: "serializer unsupported", 2: "maximum message length unacceptable", 3: "use of reserved bits (unsupported feature)", 4: "maximum connection count reached" } # map error to RawSocket handshake error reply (2nd octet) for err in ERRMAP: octet_2 = err << 4 print("error: {} => 0x{:02x}").format(ERRMAP[err], err)¶
The Client - after having sent its handshake request - will wait for the 4 octets from Router handshake reply.¶
Here is an example of how a Client might parse the second octet in a Router handshake reply:¶
# map RawSocket handshake reply (2nd octet) for i in range(256): ser_id = i & 0x0f if ser_id: # verify the serializer is the one we requested! # if not, fail the connection! ser = SERMAP.get(ser_id, 'currently undefined') maxlen = 2 ** ((i >> 4) + 9) print("{:02x} => serializer: {}, maxlen: {}".format(i, ser, maxlen)) else: err = i >> 4 print("error: {}".format(ERRMAP.get(err, 'currently undefined')))¶
Serialization¶
To send a WAMP message, the message is serialized according to the WAMP serializer agreed in the handshake (e.g. JSON, MessagePack, CBOR, UBJSON or FlatBuffers).¶
The length of the serialized messages in octets MUST NOT exceed the maximum requested by the Peer.¶
If the serialized length exceed the maximum requested, the WAMP message can not be sent to the Peer. Handling situations like the latter is left to the implementation.¶
E.g. a Router that is to forward a WAMP EVENT
to a Client which exceeds the maximum length requested by the Client when serialized might:¶
payload_limit_exceeded = true
)¶
Framing¶
The serialized octets for a message to be sent are prefixed with exactly 4 octets.¶
MSB LSB 31 0 RRRR XTTT LLLL LLLL LLLL LLLL LLLL LLLL¶
The three least significant octets constitute an unsigned 24 bit integer that provides the length of transport message payload following, excluding the 4 octets that constitute the prefix.¶
The most significant octet has the following structure¶
MSB LSB 7 0 RRRR XTTT¶
The four bits RRRR
are reserved for future use and MUST be all zeros for now.¶
X
is an extra (25th) bit used to encode the message payload length. This bit is only set when the payload length is exactly 16M octets, with the 24 remaining L
bits cleared:¶
MSB LSB 31 0 RRRR 1TTT 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000¶
When the payload length is 16M-1 octets, for example, the prefix would be:¶
MSB LSB 31 0 RRRR 0TTT 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111¶
The three bits TTT
encode the type of the transport message:¶
0: regular WAMP message 1: PING 2: PONG 3-7: reserved¶
For a regular WAMP message (TTT == 0
), the length is the length of the serialized WAMP message: the number of octets after serialization (excluding the 4 octets of the prefix).¶
For a PING
message (TTT == 1
), the length is the length of the arbitrary payload that follows. A Peer MUST reply to each PING
by sending exactly one PONG
immediately, and the PONG
MUST echo back the payload of the PING
exactly.¶
For receiving messages with WAMP-over-RawSocket, a Peer will usually read exactly 4 octets from the incoming stream, decode the transport level message type and payload length, and then receive as many octets as the length was giving.¶
When the transport level message type indicates a regular WAMP message, the transport level message payload is unserialized according to the serializer agreed in the handshake and the processed at the WAMP level.¶
WAMP-over-Batched-WebSocket is a variant of WAMP-over-WebSocket where multiple WAMP messages are sent in one WebSocket message.¶
Using WAMP message batching can increase wire level efficiency further. In particular when using TLS and the WebSocket implementation is forcing every WebSocket message into a new TLS segment.¶
WAMP-over-Batched-WebSocket is negotiated between Peers in the WebSocket opening handshake by agreeing on one of the following WebSocket subprotocols:¶
Batching with JSON works by serializing each WAMP message to JSON as normally, appending the single ASCII control character \30
(record separator) octet 0x1e
to each serialized messages, and packing a sequence of such serialized messages into a single WebSocket message:¶
Serialized JSON WAMP Msg 1 | 0x1e | Serialized JSON WAMP Msg 2 | 0x1e | ...¶
Batching with MessagePack works by serializing each WAMP message to MessagePack as normally, prepending a 32 bit unsigned integer (4 octets in big-endian byte order) with the length of the serialized MessagePack message (excluding the 4 octets for the length prefix), and packing a sequence of such serialized (length-prefixed) messages into a single WebSocket message:¶
Length of Msg 1 serialization (uint32) | serialized MessagePack WAMP Msg 1 | ...¶
With batched transport, even if only a single WAMP message is to be sent in a WebSocket message, the (single) WAMP message needs to be framed as described above. In other words, a single WAMP message is sent as a batch of length 1. Sending a batch of length 0 (no WAMP message) is illegal and a Peer MUST fail the transport upon receiving such a transport message.¶
The Long-Poll Transport is able to transmit a WAMP session over plain old HTTP 1.0/1.1. This is realized by the Client issuing HTTP/POSTs requests, one for sending, and one for receiving. Those latter requests are kept open at the server when there are no messages currently pending to be received.¶
Opening a Session¶
With the Long-Poll Transport, a Client opens a new WAMP session by sending a HTTP/POST request to a well-known URL, e.g.¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/open¶
Here, http://mypp.com/longpoll
is the base URL for the Long-Poll Transport and /open
is a path dedicated for opening new sessions.¶
The HTTP/POST request SHOULD have a Content-Type
header set to application/json
and MUST have a request body with a JSON document that is a dictionary:¶
{ "protocols": ["wamp.2.json"] }¶
The (mandatory) protocols
attribute specifies the protocols the client is willing to speak. The server will chose one from this list when establishing the session or fail the request when no protocol overlap was found.¶
The valid protocols are:¶
wamp.2.json.batched
¶
wamp.2.json
¶
wamp.2.msgpack.batched
¶
wamp.2.msgpack
¶
wamp.2.cbor.batched
¶
wamp.2.cbor
¶
The request path with this and subsequently described HTTP/POST requests MAY contain a query parameter
x
with some random or sequentially incremented value:¶http://mypp.com/longpoll/open?x=382913¶
The value is ignored, but may help in certain situations to prevent intermediaries from caching the request.¶
Returned is a JSON document containing a transport ID and the protocol to speak:¶
{ "protocol": "wamp.2.json", "transport": "kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr" }¶
As an implied side-effect, two HTTP endpoints are created¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/<transport_id>/receive http://mypp.com/longpoll/<transport_id>/send¶
where transport_id
is the transport ID returned from open
, e.g.¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr/receive http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr/send¶
Receiving WAMP Messages¶
The Client will then issue HTTP/POST requests (with empty request body) to¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr/receive¶
When there are WAMP messages pending downstream, a request will return with a single WAMP message (unbatched modes) or a batch of serialized WAMP messages (batched mode).¶
The serialization format used is the one agreed during opening the session.¶
The batching uses the same scheme as with wamp.2.json.batched
and wamp.2.msgpack.batched
transport over WebSocket.¶
Note: In unbatched mode, when there is more than one message pending, there will be at most one message returned for each request. The other pending messages must be retrieved by new requests. With batched mode, all messages pending at request time will be returned in one batch of messages.¶
Sending WAMP Messages¶
For sending WAMP messages, the Client will issue HTTP/POST requests to¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr/send¶
with request body being a single WAMP message (unbatched modes) or a batch of serialized WAMP messages (batched mode).¶
The serialization format used is the one agreed during opening the session.¶
The batching uses the same scheme as with wamp.2.json.batched
and wamp.2.msgpack.batched
transport over WebSocket.¶
Upon success, the request will return with HTTP status code 202 ("no content"). Upon error, the request will return with HTTP status code 400 ("bad request").¶
Closing a Session¶
To orderly close a session, a Client will issue a HTTP/POST to¶
http://mypp.com/longpoll/kjmd3sBLOUnb3Fyr/close¶
with an empty request body. Upon success, the request will return with HTTP status code 202 ("no content").¶
Binary data follows a convention for conversion to JSON strings.¶
A byte array is converted to a JSON string as follows:¶
\0
character¶
where Base64 encoding follows Section 4 of [RFC4648].¶
Example¶
Consider the byte array (hex representation):¶
10e3ff9053075c526f5fc06d4fe37cdb¶
This will get converted to Base64¶
EOP/kFMHXFJvX8BtT+N82w==¶
prepended with \0
¶
\x00EOP/kFMHXFJvX8BtT+N82w==¶
and serialized to a JSON string¶
"\\u0000EOP/kFMHXFJvX8BtT+N82w=="¶
A JSON string is unserialized to either a string or a byte array using the following procedure:¶
\0
character, interpret the rest (after the first character) as Base64 and decode to a byte array¶
Below are complete Python and JavaScript code examples for conversion between byte arrays and JSON strings.¶
Python¶
Here is a complete example in Python showing how byte arrays are converted to and from JSON:¶
import os, base64, json, sys, binascii data_in = os.urandom(16) print("In: {}".format(binascii.hexlify(data_in))) # encoding encoded = json.dumps('\0' + base64.b64encode(data_in). decode('ascii')) print("JSON: {}".format(encoded)) # decoding decoded = json.loads(encoded) if type(decoded) == unicode: if decoded[0] == '\0': data_out = base64.b64decode(decoded[1:]) else: data_out = decoded print("Out: {}".format(binascii.hexlify(data_out))) assert(data_out == data_in)¶
JavaScript¶
Here is a complete example in JavaScript showing how byte arrays are converted to and from JSON:¶
var data_in = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(16)); // initialize test data for (var i = 0; i < data_in.length; ++i) { data_in[i] = i; } console.log(data_in); // convert byte array to raw string var raw_out = ''; for (var i = 0; i < data_in.length; ++i) { raw_out += String.fromCharCode(data_in[i]); } // base64 encode raw string, prepend with \0 // and serialize to JSON var encoded = JSON.stringify("\0" + window.btoa(raw_out)); console.log(encoded); // "\u0000AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODw==" // unserialize from JSON var decoded = JSON.parse(encoded); var data_out; if (decoded.charCodeAt(0) === 0) { // strip first character and decode base64 to raw string var raw = window.atob(decoded.substring(1)); // convert raw string to byte array var data_out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(raw.length)); for (var i = 0; i < raw.length; ++i) { data_out[i] = raw.charCodeAt(i); } } else { data_out = decoded; } console.log(data_out);¶
A Transport may support the multiplexing of multiple logical transports over a single "physical" transport.¶
By using such a Transport, multiple WAMP sessions can be transported over a single underlying transport at the same time.¶
As an example, the proposed WebSocket extension "permessage-priority" would allow creating multiple logical Transports for WAMP over a single underlying WebSocket connection.¶
Sessions running over a multiplexed Transport are completely independent: they get assigned different session IDs, may join different realms and each session needs to authenticate itself.¶
Because of above, Multiplexed Transports for WAMP are actually not detailed in the WAMP spec, but a feature of the transport being used.¶
Note: Currently no WAMP transport supports multiplexing. The work on the MUX extension with WebSocket has stalled, and the
permessage-priority
proposal above is still just a proposal. However, with RawSocket, we should be able to add multiplexing in the the future (with downward compatibility).¶
WAMP was designed with the goals of being easy to approach and use for application developers. Creating a procedure to expose some custom functionality should be possible in any supported programming language using that language's native elements, with the least amount of additional effort.¶
Following from that, WAMP uses dynamic typing for the application payloads of calls, call results and error, as well as event payloads.¶
A WAMP router will happily forward any application payload on any procedure or topic URI as long as the client is authorized (has permission) to execute the respective WAMP action (call, register, publish or subscribe) on the given URI.¶
This approach has served WAMP well, as application developers can get started immediately, and evolve and change payloads as they need without extra steps. These advantages in flexibility of course come at a price, as nothing is free, and knowing that price is important to be aware of the tradeoffs one is accepting when using dynamic typing:¶
Problems such above could be avoided when WAMP supported an option to formally define WAMP-based Interfaces. This needs to answer the following questions:¶
args|List
and kwargs|Dict
application payloads that are used in WAMP calls, errors and events?¶
The following sections will describe the solution to each of above questions using WAMP IDL.¶
Using WAMP Interfaces finally allows to support the following application developer level features:¶
To define the application payload Arguments|list
and ArgumentsKw|dict
, WAMP IDL reuses the FlatBuffers IDL, specifically, we map a pair of Arguments|list
and ArgumentsKw|dict
to a FlatBuffers Table with WAMP defined FlatBuffers Attributes.¶
User defined WAMP application payloads are transmitted in Arguments|list
and ArgumentsKw|dict
elements of the following WAMP messages:¶
A Publisher uses the¶
PUBLISH.Arguments|list
and PUBLISH.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
message elements to send the event payload to be published to the Broker in PUBLISH
messages. When the event is accepted by the Broker, it will dispatch an EVENT
message with¶
EVENT.Arguments|list
and EVENT.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
message elements to all (eligible, and not excluded) Subscribers.¶
A Caller uses the¶
CALL.Arguments|list
and CALL.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
message elements to send the call arguments to be used to the Dealer in CALL
messages. When the call is accepted by the Dealer, it will forward¶
INVOCATION.Arguments|list
and INVOCATION.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
to the (or one of) Callee, and receive YIELD
messages with¶
YIELD.Arguments|list
and YIELD.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
message elements, which it will return to the original Caller in RESULT
messages with¶
RESULT.Arguments|list
and RESULT.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
In the error case, a Callee MAY return an ERROR
message with¶
ERROR.Arguments|list
and ERROR.ArgumentsKw|dict
¶
message elements, which again is returned to the original Caller.¶
It is important to note that the above messages and message elements are the only ones free for use with application and user defined payloads. In particular, even though the following WAMP messages and message element carry payloads defined by the specific WAMP authentication method used, they do not carry arbitrary application payloads:
HELLO.Details["authextra"]|dict
,WELCOME.Details["authextra"]|dict
,CHALLENGE.Extra|dict
,AUTHENTICATE.Extra|dict
.¶
For example, the Session Meta API includes a procedure to kill all sessions by authid with:¶
Positional arguments (args|list
)¶
authid|string
- The authentication ID identifying sessions to close.¶
Keyword arguments (kwargs|dict
)¶
reason|uri
- reason for closing sessions, sent to clients in GOODBYE.Reason
¶
message|string
- additional information sent to clients in GOODBYE.Details
under the key "message".¶
as arguments. When successful, this procedure will return a call result with:¶
Positional results (results|list
)¶
sessions|list
- The list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed.¶
Keyword results (kwresults|dict
)¶
None
¶
To specify the call arguments in FlatBuffers IDL, we can define a FlatBuffers table for both args
and kwargs
:¶
/// Call args/kwargs for "wamp.session.kill_by_authid" table SessionKillByAuthid { /// The WAMP authid of the sessions to kill. authid: string (wampuri); /// A reason URI provided to the killed session(s). reason: string (kwarg, wampuri); /// A message provided to the killed session(s). message: string (kwarg); }¶
The table contains the list args
as table elements (in order), unless the table element has an Attribute kwarg
, in which case the element one in kwarg
.¶
The attributes wampid
and wampuri
are special markers that denote values that follow the respective WAMP identifier rules for WAMP IDs and URIs.¶
When successful, the procedure will return a list of WAMP session IDs of session that were killed. Again, we can map this to FlatBuffers IDL:¶
table WampIds { /// List of WAMP IDs. value: [uint64] (wampid); }¶
WAMP IDL uses custom FlatBuffer attributes to¶
kwarg
fields which map to WAMP keyword argument vs arg
(default)¶
"Attributes may be attached to a declaration, behind a field, or after the name of a table/struct/enum/union. These may either have a value or not. Some attributes like deprecated are understood by the compiler; user defined ones need to be declared with the attribute declaration (like priority in the example above), and are available to query if you parse the schema at runtime. This is useful if you write your own code generators/editors etc., and you wish to add additional information specific to your tool (such as a help text)." (from source).¶
The Attributes used in WAMP IDL are defined in <WAMP API Catalog>/src/wamp.fbs
, and are described in the following sections:¶
arg
, kwarg
¶
wampid
¶
wampname
, wampname_s
¶
wampuri
, wampuri_s
, wampuri_p
, wampuri_sp
, wampuri_pp
, wampuri_spp
¶
uuid
¶
ethadr
¶
type
¶
WAMP Positional and Keyword-based Payloads¶
Positional payloads args|list
and keyword-based payloads kwargs|dict
are table elements that have one of the following Attributes:¶
One pair of args
and kwarg
types is declared by one FlatBuffer table with optional attributes on table fields, and the following rules apply or must be followed:¶
arg
nor kwarg
attribute is provided, arg
is assumed.¶
arg
or kwarg
MUST be specified.¶
kwarg
, all subsequent fields in the same table MUST also have attribute kwarg
.¶
WAMP IDs and URIs¶
Integers which contain WAMP IDs use Attribute¶
wampid
: WAMP ID, that is an integer [1, 2^53]
¶
Strings which contain WAMP names ("URI components"), for e.g. WAMP roles or authids use Attributes¶
wampname
: WAMP URI component (aka "name"), loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^[^\s\.#]+$
.¶
wampname_s
: WAMP URI component (aka "name"), strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^[\da-z_]+$
.¶
Strings which contain WAMP URIs or URI patterns use Attribute¶
wampuri
: WAMP URI, loose rules, no empty URI components (aka "concrete or fully qualified URI"), must match regular expression ^([^\s\.#]+\.)*([^\s\.#]+)$
.¶
wampuri_s
: WAMP URI, strict rules, no empty URI components, must match regular expression ^([\da-z_]+\.)*([\da-z_]+)$
.¶
wampuri_p
: WAMP URI or URI (prefix or wildcard) pattern, loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^(([^\s\.#]+\.)|\.)*([^\s\.#]+)?$
.¶
wampuri_sp
: WAMP URI or URI (prefix or wildcard) pattern, strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^(([\da-z_]+\.)|\.)*([\da-z_]+)?$
.¶
wampuri_pp
: WAMP URI or URI prefix pattern, loose rules (minimum required to combine to dotted URIs), must match regular expression ^([^\s\.#]+\.)*([^\s\.#]*)$
.¶
wampuri_spp
: WAMP URI or URI prefix pattern, strict rules (can be used as identifier in most languages), must match regular expression ^([\da-z_]+\.)*([\da-z_]*)$
.¶
Type/Object UUIDs¶
Types and generally any objects can be globally identified using UUIDs [RFC4122]. UUIDs can be used in WAMP IDL using the uuid
Attribute.¶
/// UUID (canonical textual representation). my_field1: string (uuid); /// UUID (128 bit binary). my_field2: uint128_t (uuid);¶
The uint128_t
is a struct type defined as¶
/// An unsigned integer with 128 bits. struct uint128_t { /// Least significand 32 bits. w0: uint32; /// 2nd significand 32 bits. w1: uint32; /// 3rd significand 32 bits. w2: uint32; /// Most significand 32 bits. w3: uint32; }¶
Ethereum Addresses¶
Ethereum addresses can be used to globally identify types or generally any object where
the global ID also needs to be conflict free, consensually shared and owned by a respective
Ethereum network user. Ethereum addresses can be used in WAMP IDL using the ethadr
Attribute:¶
/// Ethereum address (checksummed HEX encoded address). my_field1: string (ethadr); /// Ethereum address (160 bit binary). my_field2: uint160_t (ethadr);¶
The uint160_t
is a struct type defined as¶
/// An unsigned integer with 160 bits. struct uint160_t { /// Least significand 32 bits. w0: uint32; /// 2nd significand 32 bits. w1: uint32; /// 3rd significand 32 bits. w2: uint32; /// 4th significand 32 bits. w3: uint32; /// Most significand 32 bits. w4: uint32; }¶
WAMP Actions or Service Elements¶
The type of WAMP service element procedure, topic or interface is designated using the Attribute¶
type
: one of "procedure"
, "topic"
or "interface"
¶
The type
Attribute can be used to denote WAMP service interfaces, e.g. continuing with above WAMP Meta API procedure example, the wamp.session.kill_by_authid
procedure can be declared like this:¶
rpc_service IWampMeta(type: "interface", uuid: "88711231-3d95-44bc-9464-58d871dd7fd7", wampuri: "wamp") { session_kill_by_authid (SessionKillByAuthid): WampIds ( type: "procedure", wampuri: "wamp.session.kill_by_authid" ); }¶
The value of attribute type
specifies a WAMP Procedure, and the call arguments and result types of the procedure are given by:¶
SessionKillByAuthid
: procedure call arguments args
(positional argument) and kwargs
(keyword arguments) call argument follow this type¶
WampIds
: procedure call results args
(positional results) and kwargs
(keyword results)¶
The procedure will be registered under the WAMP URI wamp.session.kill_by_authid
on the respective realm.¶
WAMP services include¶
We map the two WAMP service types to FlatBuffers IDL using the Attribute type == "procedure" | "topic"
as in this example:¶
rpc_service IWampMeta(type: "interface", uuid: "88711231-3d95-44bc-9464-58d871dd7fd7", wampuri: "wamp") { session_kill_by_authid (SessionKillByAuthid): WampIds ( type: "procedure", wampuri: "wamp.session.kill_by_authid" ); session_on_leave (SessionInfo): Void ( type: "topic", wampuri: "wamp.session.on_leave" ); }¶
When the procedure wamp.session.kill_by_authid
is called to kill all sessions
with a given authid
, the procedure will return a list of WAMP session IDs of
the killed sessions via WampIds
.
Independently, meta events on topic wamp.session.on_leave
are published with
detailed SessionInfo
of the sessions left as event payload.
This follows a common "do-something-and-notify-observers" pattern for a pair of
a procedure and topic working together.¶
The Interface then collects a number of Procedures and Topics under one
named unit of type == "interface"
which includes a UUID in an uuid
Attribute.¶
Declaring Services¶
Declaring services involves three element types:¶
The general form for declaring Topics is:¶
<TOPIC-METHOD> (<TOPIC-PAYLOAD-TABLE>): Void ( type: "topic", wampuri: <TOPIC-URI> );¶
The application payload transmitted in EVENTs is typed via <TOPIC-PAYLOAD-TABLE>
. The return type MUST always be Void
, which is a dummy marker type declared in wamp.fbs
.¶
Note: With Acknowledge Event Delivery (future), when a Subscriber receives an EVENT, the Subscriber will return an Event-Acknowledgement including
args
/kwargs
. Once we do have this feature in WAMP PubSub, the type of the Event-Acknowledgement can be specified using a non-Void
return type.¶
The general form for declaring Procedures is:¶
<PROCEDURE-METHOD> (<CALL-PAYLOAD-TABLE>): <CALLRESULT-PAYLOAD-TABLE> ( type: "procedure", wampuri: <PROCEDURE-URI> );¶
The application payload transmitted in CALLs is typed via <CALL-PAYLOAD-TABLE>
. The return type of the CALL is typed via <CALLRESULT-PAYLOAD-TABLE>
.¶
The general form for declaring Interfaces, which collect Procedures and Topics is:¶
rpc_service <INTERFACE> ( type: "interface", uuid: <INTERFACE-UUID>, wampuri: <INTERFACE-URI-PREFIX> ) { /// Method declarations of WAMP Procedures and Topics }¶
Note: We are reusing FlatBuffers IDL here, specifically the
rpc_service
service definitions which were designed for gRPC. We reuse this element to declare both WAMP Topics and Procedures by using thetype
Attribute. Do not get confused with "rpc" inrpc_service
.¶
Declaring Progressive Call Results¶
Write me.¶
Declaring Call Errors¶
Write me.¶
Collections of types defined in FlatBuffers IDL are bundled in Interface Catalogs which are just ZIP files with¶
*.bfbs
compiled FlatBuffer IDL schemas¶
and optionally¶
The contents of an example.zip
interface catalog:¶
unzip -l build/example.zip Archive: build/example.zip Length Date Time Name --------- ---------- ----- ---- 0 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/ 14992 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/example2.bfbs 15088 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/example4.bfbs 13360 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/example3.bfbs 8932 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/example1.bfbs 6520 1980-00-00 00:00 schema/wamp.bfbs 1564 1980-00-00 00:00 README.md 0 1980-00-00 00:00 img/ 13895 1980-00-00 00:00 img/logo.png 1070 1980-00-00 00:00 LICENSE.txt 1288 1980-00-00 00:00 catalog.yaml --------- ------- 76709 11 files¶
The bundled Catalog Interfaces in above are FlatBuffers binary schema files which are compiled using flatc
¶
flatc -o ./schema --binary --schema --bfbs-comments --bfbs-builtins ./src¶
from FlatBuffers IDL sources, for example:¶
rpc_service IExample1 ( type: "interface", uuid: "bf469db0-efea-425b-8de4-24b5770e6241" ) { my_procedure1 (TestRequest1): TestResponse1 ( type: "procedure", wampuri: "com.example.my_procedure1" ); on_something1 (TestEvent1): Void ( type: "topic", wampuri: "com.example.on_something1" ); }¶
The catalog.yaml
file contains catalog metadata in YAML Format:¶
Field | Description |
---|---|
name
|
Catalog name, which must contain only lower-case letter, numbers, hyphen and underscore so the catalog name can be used in HTTP URLs |
version
|
Catalog version (e.g. semver or calendarver version string) |
title
|
Catalog title for display purposes |
description
|
Catalog description, a short text describing the API catalog |
schemas
|
FlatBuffers schemas compiled into binary schema reflection format |
author
|
Catalog author |
publisher
|
Ethereum Mainnet address of publisher |
license
|
SPDX license identifier (see https://spdx.org/licenses/) for the catalog |
keywords
|
Catalog keywords to hint at the contents, topic, usage or similar of the catalog |
homepage
|
Catalog home page or project page |
git
|
Git source repository location |
theme
|
Catalog visual theme |
Here is a complete example:¶
name: example version: 22.6.1 title: WAMP Example API Catalog description: An example of a WAMP API catalog. schemas: - schema/example1.bfbs - schema/example2.bfbs - schema/example3.bfbs - schema/example4.bfbs author: typedef int GmbH publisher: "0x60CC48BFC44b48A53e793FE4cB50e2d625BABB27" license: MIT keywords: - wamp - sample homepage: https://wamp-proto.org/ git: https://github.com/wamp-proto/wamp-proto.git theme: background: "#333333" text: "#e0e0e0" highlight: "#00ccff" logo: img/logo.png¶
Archive File Preparation¶
The ZIP archive format and tools, by default, include filesystem and other metadata from the host producing the archive. That information usually changes, per-archive run, as e.g. the current datetime is included, which obviously progresses.¶
When sharing and publishing a WAMP Interface Catalog, it is crucial that the archive only depends on the actual contents of the compressed files.¶
Removing all unwanted ZIP archive metadata can be achieved using stripzip:¶
stripzip example.zip¶
The user build scripts for compiling and bundling an Interface Catalog ZIP file MUST be repeatable, and only depend on the input source files. A build process that fulfills this requirement is called Reproducible build.¶
The easiest way to check if your build scripts producing example.zip
is reproducible is repeat the build and check that the file fingerprint of the resulting archive stays the same:¶
openssl sha256 example.zip¶
Catalog Publication on Ethereum and IPFS¶
Write me.¶
Feature status: sketch¶
Reflection denotes the ability of WAMP peers to examine the procedures, topics and errors provided or used by other peers.¶
I.e. a WAMP Caller, Callee, Subscriber or Publisher may be interested in retrieving a machine readable list and description of WAMP procedures and topics it is authorized to access or provide in the context of a WAMP session with a Dealer or Broker.¶
Reflection may be useful in the following cases:¶
WAMP predefines the following procedures for performing run-time reflection on WAMP peers which act as Brokers and/or Dealers.¶
Predefined WAMP reflection procedures to list resources by type:¶
wamp.reflection.topic.list wamp.reflection.procedure.list wamp.reflection.error.list¶
Predefined WAMP reflection procedures to describe resources by type:¶
wamp.reflection.topic.describe wamp.reflection.procedure.describe wamp.reflection.error.describe¶
A peer that acts as a Broker SHOULD announce support for the reflection API by sending¶
HELLO.Details.roles.broker.reflection|bool := true¶
A peer that acts as a Dealer SHOULD announce support for the reflection API by sending¶
HELLO.Details.roles.dealer.reflection|bool := true¶
Since Brokers might provide (broker) procedures and Dealers might provide (dealer) topics, both SHOULD implement the complete API above (even if the peer only implements one of Broker or Dealer roles).¶
Reflection Events and Procedures¶
A topic or procedure is defined for reflection:¶
wamp.reflect.define¶
A topic or procedure is asked to be described (reflected upon):¶
wamp.reflect.describe¶
A topic or procedure has been defined for reflection:¶
wamp.reflect.on_define¶
A topic or procedure has been undefined from reflection:¶
wamp.reflect.on_undefine¶
Write me.¶
wamp.r2r.traffic_payable
¶
xbr.pool.buy_key
, and calling wamp.r2r.submit_traffic_payment
, which returns a traffic usage report.¶
Data Spaces are end-to-end encrypted routing realms connecting data driven microservices.¶
The message routing between the microservice endpoints in¶
WAMP pre-defines the following error URIs for the Advanced Profile. WAMP peers SHOULD only use the defined error messages.¶
The Client session has been forcefully terminated by the Router - used as a GOODBYE
(or ABORT
) reason.¶
wamp.close.killed¶
No authentication method the Client offered is accepted.¶
wamp.error.no_matching_auth_method¶
The Client attempted to authenticate for a non-existing Realm (realm|string
).¶
wamp.error.no_such_realm¶
The Client attempted to authenticate for a non-existing Role (authrole|string
).¶
wamp.error.no_such_role¶
The Client authenticated for a non-existing Principal (authid|string
).¶
wamp.error.no_such_principal¶
The authentication as presented by the Client is denied (e.g. "wrong password").¶
wamp.error.authentication_denied¶
The Client authentication was rejected due to a technical runtime failure ("fail secure" operation).¶
wamp.error.authentication_failed¶
The Client did not provide the required, non-anonymous, authentication information.¶
wamp.error.authentication_required¶
A Dealer or Callee terminated a call that timed out¶
wamp.error.timeout¶
A Peer requested an interaction with an option that was disallowed by the Router¶
wamp.error.option_not_allowed¶
A Router rejected client request to disclose its identity¶
wamp.error.option_disallowed.disclose_me¶
A Router encountered a network failure¶
wamp.error.network_failure¶
A Callee is not able to handle an invocation for a call and intends for the Router to re-route the call to another fitting Callee. For details, refer to RPC Call Rerouting¶
wamp.error.unavailable¶
A Dealer could not perform a call, since a procedure with the given URI is registered, but all available registrations have responded with wamp.error.unavailable
¶
wamp.error.no_available_callee¶
A Dealer received a CALL
message with advanced features that cannot be processed by the Callee¶
wamp.error.feature_not_supported¶
This chapter contains a list of technical terms used in this specification, along with their respective meanings.¶
Implementations SHOULD use terms as defined here in their public interfaces and documentation, and SHOULD NOT reinvent or reinterpret terms. Users SHOULD be able to transfer their WAMP knowledge from one implementation to another. This is to support the overarching goal of WAMP to free application developers from restrictions when building distributed applications, both at the network level, and when choosing (or switching) the WAMP implementations used.¶
Our goal is to maximize user choice and experience when developing WAMP-based applications, both formally (open protocol and open source) as well as practically (switching costs).¶
Term | Definition |
---|---|
User | A person (or organization) running a WAMP Client or Router |
Client | A program run by a User, with application code using WAMP for application-level communications |
Router | A program run by a User, with middleware code using WAMP to provide application routing services |
Peer | A WAMP Client or Router. An implementation might embed, provide or use both roles |
Realm | Isolated WAMP URI namespace serving as a routing and administrative domain, optionally protected by AA |
Transport | A message-based, reliable, ordered, bidirectional (full-duplex) channel over which Peers communicate |
Connection | An underlying entity (if any) carrying the Transport, e.g. a network connection, pipe, queue or such |
Session | Transient conversation between a Client and a Router, within a Realm and over a Transport |
Message | Indivisible unit of information transmitted between peers |
Serializer | Encodes WAMP messages, with application payloads, into byte strings for transport |
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Caller | A Caller is a Session that calls, with application payloads, a (fully qualified) Procedure for call routing |
Callee | A Callee is a Session that responds to Procedure call invocations by yielding back application result payloads |
Procedure | A Procedure is an URI or URI pattern that can be registered for call routing by Callees |
Registration | A Router record resulting from a Callee successfully registering a Procedure for call routing |
Call | A transient Router record resulting from a Caller successfully calling a Procedure for call routing |
Invocation | A call request and payload that are routed to a Callee having a matching Registration for the called Procedure |
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Publisher | A Publisher is a Session that publishes application payloads to a (fully qualified) Topic for event routing |
Subscriber | A Subscriber is a Session that subscribes to a Topic to receive application payloads on matching events |
Topic | A Topic is an URI or URI pattern that can be subscribed to for event routing by Subscribers |
Subscription | A Router record resulting from a Subscriber successfully subscribing to a Topic for event routing |
Publication | A transient Router record resulting from a Publisher successfully publishing to a Topic for event routing |
Event | A publication that is routed to Subscribers having matching Subscriptions to the published Topic. |
WAMP uses the Subprotocol Identifier wamp
registered with the WebSocket Subprotocol Name Registry, operated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).¶
All diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative, as are all sections explicitly marked non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].¶
Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as "strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word ("MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY", etc.) used in introducing the algorithm.¶
Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps MAY be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is equivalent.¶
Key terms such as named algorithms or definitions are indicated like this when they first occur, and are capitalized throughout the text.¶
WAMP was developed in an open process from the beginning, and a lot of people have contributed ideas and other feedback. Here we are listing people who have opted in to being mentioned:¶